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JURISDICTIONAL SALVATION AND THE
HAGUE TREATY
Kevin M. Clermontf
INTRODUCrION
The United States' law of territorial jurisdiction in civil cases is a
mess. Many commentators, here and abroad, have said so for a long
time.' The United States' treatment of foreign judgments, however,
stands in contrast. As a well-behaved member of the international
community of nations, the United States eagerly gives appropriate re-
spect to foreign judgments, despite sometimes getting no respect in
return.2
Now, ongoing negotiations at the Hague have generated a pros-
pect for an international agreement on the reciprocal treatment of
foreignjudgments. The envisaged treaty would ensure mutual respect
of judgments among contracting countries, but it would also require
agreement on a sensible scheme of jurisdiction. Such a treaty would
produce the great benefit of rationalizing U.S. jurisdictional law on
the international level. Ironically, this treaty would hand lawmakers a
bigger, but hidden, benefit in providing the opportunity to untangle
the jurisdictional law applied at home. Rethinking jurisdiction
through the process of treatymaking would permit the United States
to improve its own interstate law. The Hague negotiations thus repre-
sent a major legal development, but they are proceeding without
much professional awareness.
t Flanagan Professor of Law, Cornell University. The author would like to thank
Bernard Audit, Ronald Brand, Stephen Burbank, Theodore Eisenberg, Joaquim Forner,
Robert Hillman, Mary Brigid McManamon, Emily Sherwin, and Barry Vasios for their very
helpful critiques of this Article, and also to thank the students and professors at Cornell's
Institute of International and Comparative Law at the University of Paris for helping him
think through this subject.
1 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century or Beginning
of the Millennium7, 7 TUL.J. INT'L & Comp. L. 111, 123 (1999) ("[T]he American house of
jurisdiction to adjudicate is not a place where any sensible person other than a lawyer (if
that is not redundant) wants to live."); Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting,
28 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 1027, 1027 (1995) ("American jurisdictional law is a mess."). For a
critical overview of territorial jurisdiction in the United States, see generally Kevin M. Cler-
mont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CoiRNLL L.
REV. 411, 423-29 (1981).
2 See ANtRAs F. LowENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LrIGATION AND ARBrrRATION 368
(1993) ("The United States... appears to be the most receptive of any major country to
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments .... ."); infra note 28.
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Part I of this Article describes the probable Hague treaty. Part II
then paints the big picture of potential reform for U.S. jurisdictional
law not only on the international level, but especially on the domestic
level. However, as Part III discusses, the reform might raise constitu-
tional questions. The reform probably would authorize jurisdiction
formerly prohibited to U.S. courts and would push federal law into
domains that state law currently occupies. This Article closes by argu-
ing that the treatymakers' and Congress's powers are broad enough to
work the reform.
I
PATHS TO AND FROM A TRFAiy
European countries appear to be ahead of the United States on
the reciprocal treatment of foreign judgments. The European Union
has an enlightened, albeit far from perfect, treaty called the Brussels
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters.a Through this treaty, the member states
agree to virtually automatic recognition and enforcement of the judg-
ments of the other member states.4 This provision is similar to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.5
In order to reach this agreement, the drafters of the Brussels
Convention created a "double convention" by also defining the requi-
site bases of territorial jurisdiction.6 This restriction functions in the
same manner as the Due Process Clause7 does among the states of the
United States. All U.S. states submit to federal restrictions on how far
they can reach jurisdictionally, and in return they fully realize the ben-
efits of a judicially unified nation: they can confidently give, and
thereby receive, full faith and credit in respect to sister-state judg-
ments, because the states know that due process restricts all other
states to appropriate territorial jurisdiction, as well as to basically fair
procedure. Correspondingly, under the Brussels Convention, the Eu-
3 Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 OJ. (L 299) 32 [hereinafter Brussels Convention], reprinted as
amended in 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990). On this Convention and the related Lugano Conven-
tion, see generally ALAN DASHWOOD ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE CIVILJURISDIGTION AND JUDC-
MENTS CONVENTnON (1987), and Robert C. Reuland, The Recognition of Judgments in the
European Community: The Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Brussels Convention, 14 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 559 (1993). On some of its shortcomings, see infra text accompanying notes 89-90, and
on its revision currently under way, see infra note 170.
4 See Brussels Convention, supra note 3, tit. IH, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. at
1424-28.
5 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
6 See Brussels Convention, supra note 3, tit. II, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. at
1418-24. See generally Arthur T. von Mehren, EnforcingJudgments Abroad: Reflections on the
Design of Recognition Conventions, 24 BRooiLJ. INT'L L. 17 (1998) (discussing double conven-
tions and their advantages and disadvantages).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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ropean member states can respect other members' judgments, be-
cause they know that the Convention restricts the others to
appropriate jurisdictional reach. Europe is currently in the midst of
an exciting time as the supranational European Court ofJustice over-
sees the national courts and actively works out the details, much as the
Marshall Court united the American judicial systems two centuries
ago.
Of course, the Brussels Convention's definition of jurisdictional
bases draws on the civil law tradition. Civil law embraced the Roman
idea ofjurisdictional restraint, which reflected a spirit of fairness.8 Ac-
tor sequiturforum rei was ajustinian maxim pronouncing that the plain-
tiff follows the defendant's forum.9 Generally, the civil law required
the plaintiff to go to the forum at the defendant's domicile, and that
forum could entertain any cause of action against the defendant re-
gardless of where it arose. Eventually, there was additional provision
for long-arn-like jurisdiction in actions of tort, contract, and property,
so that, for instance, a plaintiff could sue for a tort at the place of
wrongful conduct.' 0 In other words, the civilian tradition differed
from the U.S. tradition of tying jurisdiction to the power existing in-
side the sovereign's territorial boundaries," with telling
consequences.
Modern French jurisdictional law, as an example of continental
law, accepts most of these civilian ideas for its law applicable outside
the Brussels Convention.12 On the one hand, without the impulses of
the U.S. power theory, France has not produced excesses such as tran-
8 See generally RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 379-80, 405-06, 413-
34 (6th ed. 1998) (illustrating the difference between civil and common law); Friedrich
Juenger, JudicialJurisdiction in the United States and in the European Communities: A Compari-
son, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1203-04 (1984) (discussing the Roman origins of the modern
civil-law concept of jurisdiction).
9 SeeJuenger, supra note 8, at 1203.
10 See id.
I See infra text accompanying note 52.
12 See NouvEAu CODE DE PROCtDURE cILE [N.C.P.C.] arts. 42-48 (Fr.);JEAN VINCENT &
SERGE GUINCHARD, PROCtDURE CIVILE 193-205, 222 (22d ed. 1991); Thierry Bernard et al.,
France, in 1 TRANSNATIONAL LmGATION at FRA-1, FRA-12 to -23 (Richard H. Kriender gen.
ed., 1997); Christine Lkcuyer-Thieffry, France, in IN-ERNATIoNAL CIVIL PROCEDURES 241,
244-49 (Christian T. Campbell ed., 1995) (comparing French rules with Anglo-American
principles and explaining French rules of international jurisdiction); Ren6e Y. Nauta &
GerardJ. Meijer, French CivilProcedure, inACCSS TO CIVIL PROCEDURE ABROAD 131, 140, 142
(HenkJ. Snjders ed. & Benjamin Rujsenaars trans., 1996).
1999]
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sientjurisdiction 3 or attachment jurisdiction.' 4 On the other hand,
without the restraints of the power theory, France has succumbed
even more blatantly to parochial impulses, such that Article 14 of its
Civil Code authorizes personal jurisdiction for virtually any action
brought by a plaintiff of French nationality (while Article 15 has the
effect of making excessive any foreign state's exercise of jurisdiction
over an unwilling French defendant).15 Thus, a French person can sue
at home whether or not the events in suit relate to France and regard-
less of the defendant's connections to France and interests in having
the suit litigated elsewhere. The French approach to jurisdiction has
emigrated with French law to other countries. 16 The forum-shopping
potential ofjurisdiction based on the plaintiffs nationality is evident,
even though in practice this exorbitantjurisdiction may not be abused
all that often.17
The Brussels Convention takes only the best of the civilian tradi-
tion regardingjurisdiction.18 The defendant's domicile is the founda-
tional idea,'9 although the Convention adds long-arm-like jurisdiction
for tort and contract actions.20 The Convention provides exclusive lo-
13 Under U.S. law, the ancient basis of presence gives the forum state power to adjudi-
cate any personal claim if the defendant is served with process within the state's territorial
limits. Thus, even momentary physical presence of the defendant at the time of service
creates power to adjudicate a claim totally unrelated to that transient presence. For exam-
ple, P, a Florida corporation, achieves in-state, in-hand service of process in a Louisiana
action on D, a German attending a convention in New Orleans. The action concerns a
contract between D and Pfor delivery of German goods to Florida. The court in Louisiana
has personal jurisdiction. See Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 270-71
(5th Cir. 1985).
14 In so-called attachment jurisdiction, the plaintiff seeks to apply the defendant's
property to the satisfaction of a claim against the defendant that is unrelated to the prop-
erty. For example, New York plaintiffs might obtain jurisdiction in a New York court for a
tort claim arising from a plane crash in Turkey by garnishing a New York bank account
belonging to the defendant, Turkish Airlines. If successful on the merits, the plaintiffs
would apply the bank account to awarded court costs and then to the satisfaction of the
tort claim. However, on such attachment jurisdiction, the plaintiffs' recovery is limited to
the bank account. See Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273, 1278-79 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
15 See CODE CML [C. cIv.] arts. 14-15 (Fr.); YVON LoussouARN & PIERRE BOUREL,
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIve 489-97 (4th ed. 1993); PIERRE MAYER, DRorr INTERNATIONAL
PRlt 198-203 (4th ed. 1991).
16 See, e.g., Brussels Convention, supra note 3, art. 3, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. at
1418 (listing the signatories' exorbitant jurisdiction, thereby illustrating the emigration of
French law to Belgium and Luxembourg). Incidentally, the Convention not only preserves
this exorbitant jurisdiction against outsiders, but also extends any existing plaintiff-based
jurisdiction from the country's nationals to its domiciliaries as plaintiffs. See id. art. 4, re-
printed as amended in 29 I.L.M. at 1419.
17 See Friedrich K Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 BRooK. J. INT'L L. 111,
115-16 (1998).
18 See generally STEPHEN CROMIE, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LrrIGATION 3-29 (1990).
19 See Brussels Convention, supra note 3, art. 2, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. at
1418.
20 See id. art. 5, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. at 1419.
[Vol. 85:89
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caljurisdiction in actions concerning real property and the like,21 and
it allows certain disadvantaged plaintiffs, such as consumers, to sue at
home.22 The Convention also authorizes forum selection clauses.23
On the prohibited side, each member state gave up its exorbitant
jurisdiction, 24 but only as against domiciliaries of other member
states.2 5 So, France gave up jurisdiction based on the plaintiff's
French nationality. England, too, is now a signatory and has relin-
quished transient and attachment jurisdiction. Furthermore, the
Convention not only prohibits exorbitant jurisdiction, but also makes
mandatory the permissible bases of jurisdiction. Accordingly, Eng-
land abandoned its judicial practice of sometimes declining jurisdic-
tion on expressly discretionary grounds, 26 but again only when the
Convention applies. 27
However, the European approach is not always better than U.S.
law when it comes to jurisdiction orjudgments. The Brussels Conven-
tion openly discriminates against outsiders, as it applies only to de-
fendants domiciled in a signatory state. Accordingly, although France
cannot use its exorbitant jurisdiction in a suit by a French person
against an English person, it can use the exorbitant jurisdiction when
the defendant is an American instead. Moreover, the resulting
French judgment would receive virtually automatic recognition and
enforcement in England against the American or the American's as-
sets located in England.
Similarly, recognition and enforcement of judgments under the
Brussels Convention do not extend to judgments rendered by a coun-
try that is not a signatory state. The European countries, in fact, tradi-
tionally have been, and continue to be, rather stingy in extending
respect to foreign judgments not covered by treaty. Indeed, in this
regard, most countries in the world have demonstrated a more height-
ened notion of sovereignty than what the United States would en-
dorse. Even if a U.S. judgment passes the foreign court's
jurisdictional reexamination, which may well involve meeting all the
standards of the foreign jurisdictional law, the foreign court often im-
21 See id. art. 16, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. at 1422.
22 See id. arts. 13-15, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. at 1421-22.
23 See id. art. 17, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. at 1422.
24 See id. art. 3, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. at 1418.
25 See id. art. 4, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. at 1419.
26 See Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 11 (Eng.), reprinted in 1 THE SupamE
COURT PRAncE: 1988, at 79-97 (Jack I.H. Jacob gen. ed., 1987); LoW ENF, supra note 2,
at 178-80, 199-201.
27 See Richard G. Fentiman, Jurisdiction, Discretion and the Brussels Convention, 26 COR-
NELL INT'L LJ. 59, 60 (1993).
1999]
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poses other obstacles, such as reexamining the merits to ensure that
the applied law conforms to local policy.2 8
A hypothetical example will drive home the astounding reality.
Assume that Apple Pi, a New Yorker with property in England, had a
car collision at home in Ithaca, New York, with Franc Delta, a law pro-
fessor from France. Imagine that Franc sues Apple in Paris. This ju-
risdiction is fine under France's Article 14, being personal jurisdiction
based on the plaintiffs French nationality. Moreover, ajudgment for
Franc will be entitled under the Brussels Convention to recognition
and enforcement against Apple's property in England. Now assume
conversely that the collision occurred in Paris. Imagine that Pi sues
Delta in New York. Jurisdiction based solely on the plaintiff s U.S. na-
tionality is impermissible under U.S. law. If a default judgment were
rendered, neither France nor England would enforce it, because the
judgment is invalid for lack of personal jurisdiction. Even a litigated
judgment would enjoy far less than automatic recognition and en-
forcement abroad.
Thus, U.S. citizens are being whipsawed. Not only are they still
subject to the far-reaching jurisdiction of European courts and the
wide enforceability of the resulting judgments, but also U.S. judg-
ments tend to be given short shrift in European courts. This situation
is untenable for the United States, even if at the present time the
problems are more often theoretical than real.29 Consequently, in
1992 the United States initiated an ongoing push to conclude a multi-
lateral treaty on jurisdiction and judgments through the Hague Con-
ference on Private International Law. 30
The United States continues to work hard to produce agreement
at the Hague with the Europeans, who hold the primary adverse inter-
ests in the negotiations. Despite the United States' market power, it
28 See ENFORCING FOREIGNJUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED STATESJUDG-
MENrS ABROAD 66-70 (Ronald A. Brand ed., 1992);JosEPH M. LooKOFSIo, TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 491-558 (1992); LowENFELD, supra note 2, at
368-69, 439-54; see also, e.g., MAYER, supra note 15, at 280-33 (discussing French law's treat-
ment of foreign judgments). But cf. Patrick J. Borchers, A Few Little Issues for the Hague
Judgments Negotiations, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 157, 159 (1998) (observing that arbitration
reduces the need for ajudgments treaty); Juenger, supra note 17, at 114-16 (downplaying
enforcement concerns); Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial Is Our Need for a Judgments-
Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 167,
170-73, 178-84 (1998) (stressing the lack of empirical data on whether the United States
needs a judgments convention).
29 See Kathryn A. Russell, Exorbitant Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgments: The Brussels
System as an Impetus for United States Action, 19 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & COM. 57, 78-80 (1993).
But seeJuenger, supra note 17, at 114-16.
30 For the background of the Hague negotiations, see Peter H. Pfund, The Project of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law to Prepare a Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition/Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7
(1998).
[Vol. 85:89
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brings little bargaining power to the table: although the Europeans
have an interest in a more certain and restrained American jurisdic-
tional law, they already receive mightily favorable treatment of their
own judgments, and they still can balk at huge American awards.31
Nonetheless, in October 2000 or at its next quadrennial meeting after
that, the Hague Conference likely will approve a treaty for signature,
ratification, and implementation. The expectation is that this even-
tual multilateral convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement ofjudgments in civil and commercial matters will be sim-
ilar to the Brussels Convention.3 2
This eventuality means that the United States might soon aban-
don-on the international level among signatory countries33-tran-
sient jurisdiction, attachment jurisdiction, and "doing business" as a
basis for generaljurisdiction.3 4 The Europeans' principal objection to
31 See Borchers, supra note 28, at 157-59; Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner.
Making Procedural Law for International Civil Litigation, LAw & CoNTFiP. PROBS., Summer
1994, at 103, 138-39 (discussing the problem of "unilateral generosity... that... may
weaken U.S. bargaining power"); Juenger, supra note 17, at 113-14, 116-18, 119-20. One
way to create bargaining power would be for the United States to reinvigorate the old rule
of reciprocity from Hilton v. Guyot 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895), but practically speaking that is
unlikely to happen.
32 For the best, albeit avowedly tentative and incomplete, description of the content
of the eventual treaty, see Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and the Effects ofJudg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Hague Working Doc. No. 241 (June 18, 1999) [herein-
after Treaty Draft]; Preliminary Draft Out Line to Assist in the Preparation of a Convention on
International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Hague Conf. Info. Doc. No. 2 (Sept. 1998) [hereinafter Treaty Outline]; see also Catherine
Kessedjian, Synthesis of the Work of the Special Commission of March 1998 on International Juris-
diction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Hague Conf. Pre-
lim. Doc. No. 9 (July 1998) [hereinafter 1998 Synthesis] (referring to corresponding
sections of the Brussels Convention) ; Catherine Kessedjian, Synthesis of the Work of the Spe-
cial Commission ofJune 1997 on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Hague Conf. Prelim. Doc. No. 8 (Nov. 1997) [hereinafter 1997
Synthesis] (referring to specific sections of the Brussels Convention as examples). On the
possibility of a mixed convention instead of a double convention, see infra text accompany-
ing note 142.
33 See Treaty Outline, supra note 32, art. 2 (delineating the treaty's geographical scope).
34 Presence and domicile, which rest on supposedly strong contacts between the de-
fendant and the forum state, give the state power to adjudicate any personal claim whether
or not the claim is related to those contacts. Thus, these bases support "general jurisdic-
tion," which denotes the existence of personajurisdiction for any claim whatsoever against
the defendant. They workably provide a predictably certain and usually fair forum.
Additionally, if a defendant's business activities in the forum state when served with
process are extensively continuous and systematic-which is phrased as "doing business" as
opposed to merely "transacting business"-the defendant becomes subject to jurisdiction
even on claims wholly unrelated to the in-state activities. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952) (upholdingjurisdiction in an Ohio state-court suit
against a Philippine corporation, which was temporarily performing all of its management
activities in Ohio while mining was suspended by the effects of war in the Philippines, on a
basically unrelated claim); cf. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 416-19 (1984) (finding that Texas had no general jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion, but not reaching the difficult issue of more specific jurisdiction). In this way, the
1999]
HeinOnline -- 85 Cornell L. Rev. 95 1999-2000
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
U.S. jurisdictional law is its proclivity to base general jurisdiction on
rather thin contacts, namely, allowing any and all causes of action to
be brought on the basis of the defendant's physical presence, property
ownership, or doing business in the forum. They do not object to
specific jurisdiction,35 as long as a rules-based approach controls its
mandatory application. Thus, jurisdiction under the treaty would ex-
ist at the unconsenting defendant's habitual residence or the place
where a specific part of the events in suit occurred, but would not extend
to the broader bases of jurisdiction now authorized by U.S. law. In
exchange, the United States would get other countries to respect its
judgments and also to renounce their own exorbitant jurisdiction.
The path to international agreement is not smooth. The Brussels
Convention, for instance, provides for so-called derivativejurisdiction,
another idea coming from French law.3 6 This provision permits per-
sonaljurisdiction over codefendants, as long as jurisdiction based on
domicile exists over one defendant, and permits personal jurisdiction
over any third-party defendants.3 7 Americans, used to testing personal
jurisdiction separately and independently for each defendant, find
this doctrine so foreign that they have trouble even comprehending
it.38 How should the negotiators compromise on this point? Does the
European laxity rest primarily on administrative convenience? Does
the American fetish derive primarily from its power heritage? What
does fairness dictate?39 Because of this point and many more signifi-
development of the state-directed-act basis has revealed the absence of a clear distinction
between general and specific jurisdiction; and this kind of mixed jurisdiction arguably
combines general jurisdiction's risk of unfairness with the uncertainty of specific
jurisdiction.
35 Consent and state-directed acts, which rest on lesser contacts between the defen-
dant and the forum state than does general jurisdiction, give the state power to adjudicate
only those personal claims related to the contacts. Thus, these bases support "specific
jurisdiction," a term that denotes personal jurisdiction for related claims only. They pro-
vide useful and indeed necessary jurisdiction, but can give rise to some very difficult
problems of line-drawing.
36 See N.C.P.C. art. 42, para. 2 (Fr.) ("S'il y a plusieurs defendeurs, le demandeur saisit, d
son choix, la juridiction du lieu od demeure l'un d'eux [If there are several defendants, the
plaintiff can choose the jurisdiction of any defendant's domicile.]"); id. art. 333 (third-
party practice); PETER HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 193-95 (1967).
37 See Brussels Convention, supra note 3, art. 6, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. at
1419-20.
38 U.S. doctrine, however, is not so pure on closer inspection. When territorial juris-
diction becomes an especial impediment to multiparty litigation, the U.S. approach is to
overlook the requirement altogether. Examples include the involuntary plaintiff doctrine,
see RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIAIS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1280-81
(7th ed. 1997), vouching in and other extensions of privity, see id. at 1179-83, 1205-06, and
class actions, see id. at 220 & n.m. Perhaps a comparative study of derivative jurisdiction
could lead U.S. law toward a rational and clear set of rules, within the rather permissive
bounds of due process, that would specify the binding reach of litigation for such special
situations.
39 See 1998 Synthesis, supra note 32, at 38-40.
[Vol. 85:89
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cant points-and given the United States' spotty record in procedural
treatymaking 4°-it is far from a certainty that the parties will reach
agreement on a treaty.41
Reaching agreement on a multilateral treaty, or even merely
drafting the best U.S. proposal, could yield great returns. On the in-
ternational level, of course, a treaty would resolve the whipsawing pre-
dicament in which U.S. citizens today find themselves regarding
jurisdiction and judgments, while moving the world toward justice
without regard to international boundaries.42 On the domestic level,
the treaty effort might inspire Congress to enact the treaty's or the
U.S. proposal's jurisdictional provisions as domestic law, as Italy re-
cently has done with the Brussels Convention.43 That is, Congress
could legislate that federal and state courts, not only in all interna-
tional cases but also in interstate cases, possess jurisdiction only if the
case's circumstances satisfy the treaty's or the proposal's analogous ju-
risdictional provision. Thus, with salvation coming from an unex-
pected direction, the United States might achieve the optimal law on
territorial authority to adjudicate, an optimum upon which this Arti-
cle will elaborate next: a law under which constitutional limits fade
into the background and legislative rules move to the fore by provid-
ing certainty and restraint.
II
NET BENEFITS OF REFORM
To get an idea of the benefits of a Hague judgments and jurisdic-
tion treaty for civil cases, one first must briefly review the current U.S.
law regarding treatment of judgments and territorial jurisdiction.
The treaty directly would change the U.S. law in much of interna-
tional litigation and might induce reform in regard to domestic litiga-
tion as well.
Today a U.S. court will recognize, or in other words give effect
under the doctrine of resjudicata to, a U.S. judgment that is valid and
40 See Weintraub, supra note 28, at 168-69.
41 See Borchers, supra note 28, at 157;Juenger, supra note 17, at 121; Weintraub, supra
note 28, at 220.
42 See Andrew L. Strauss, Where America Ends and the International Order Begins: Interpret-
ing the Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Constitution in Light of a Proposed Hague Convention on
Jurisdiction and Satisfaction ofJudgments, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1237, 1238-41 (1998).
43 See Law No. 218 of May 31, 1995, art. 3(2), Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica
Italiana [Gazz. Uff.], Supp. Ord. No. 128, June 3, 1995 (Italy), translated in 35 I.L.M. 765
(1996) ("Italian courts shall further [beyond when the defendant has an Italian domicile
or residence] have jurisdiction according to the criteria set out in [the long-arm provisions
in Articles 5-15 of the Brussels Convention], including when the defendant is not domi-
ciled in the territory of a contracting State .... ."); Margreet B. de Boer, Italian Civil Proce-
dure, in AccEss TO CVL PROCEDURE ABROAD, supra note 12, at 313, 323-26. The
jurisdictional provisions of the Italian statute appear in this Article's Appendix.
1999]
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final. 44 For a judgment to be valid, generally speaking, the rendering
court must have had territorial jurisdiction, as well as possessing sub-
ject-matterjurisdiction and providing adequate notice. When the sec-
ond court faces the question of whether the prior judgment is valid
and final, it should apply the law of the judgment-rendering sover-
eign, which of course is subject to any applicable higher restraints,
such as the Due Process Clause and other federal provisions that are
imposed on and become part of state law.45 When the second court
faces a question of res judicata based on the prior judgment, it simi-
larly should apply the law that the rendering court would apply, in-
cluding any applicable higher restraints. 46 Furthermore, the second
court will enforce a judgment entitled to recognition. 47 However,
with respect to the method of enforcement, the second court applies
its own law, subject to the proviso that the method should not be so
complex or expensive as to burden unduly the enforcement of
nondomestic judgments.
U.S. courts treat judgments of foreign nations much like U.S.
judgments, although they approach foreign judgments more flexibly,
because respect for foreign judgments flows from comity rather than
from constitutional obligation.48 U.S. courts give respect to foreign
judgments not only because finality is a fair and efficient policy, but
also because U.S. courts hope to encourage abroad similar respect for
their own judgments.
As a U.S. court owes respect only to valid foreign judgments, it
can ask whether territorial jurisdiction existed under the foreign law.
But, because the U.S. court has no guarantee that a foreign judgment,
although comporting with the basic requirements of the foreign law,
is minimally acceptable to U.S. justice, it will not recognize or enforce
a foreign judgment resulting from proceedings that failed to meet the
44 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAvS § 93 (1971) (amended 1988);
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OFJUDGMENTS §§ 86-87 (1982).
45 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFrLcr OF LAWS §§ 92, 107 (1971).
46 See id. §§ 94-97 (amended 1988).
47 See id. §§ 99-102.
48 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 481 (1987); Weintraub, supra note 28, at 173-77. Oddly enough, thus far international
law itself has played no real role in the U.S. treatment of foreign judgments, except to the
extent that the U.S. approach is already a manifestation of the generally recognized princi-
ples that constitute part of international law. The United States has not a single treaty on
the subject.
Indeed, in a diversity action, according to the post-Erie case law, the federal court looks
to state law on recognition of a foreignjudgment. See, e.g., Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 612
F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1980). However, an argument could be made that in all federal
cases, and even in all state cases as well, federal law should govern because of the federal
interest in foreign relations. SeeJohn Norton Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965
DuKE LJ. 248, 265. A treaty would, of course, federalize the law on recognition of a for-
eign judgment See Harold G. Maier, A Hague Conference Judgments Convention and United
States Courts: A Problem and a Possibility, 61 AL. L. REv. 1207, 1219 (1998).
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basic American notions of due process.49 Therefore, the consensus is
that the U.S. court can examine whether the foreign assertion ofjuris-
diction would have satisfied the U.S. tests of due process. 5 0 In other
words, the U.S. court not only will apply the foreign law's limitations
on territorial jurisdiction, but more importantly will ask whether the
foreign court's jurisdiction would have passed U.S. due process mus-
ter, as if the U.S. Constitution controlled the foreign law.
Treatment ofjudgments thus leads inevitably to consideration of
jurisdictional law. The well-known basic U.S. law on jurisdiction that
comes from the Due Process Clause is this: the forum state acquires
the requisite adjudicatory authority through power over the target of
the action (be it a person or a thing), unless litigating the action there
is unreasonable (that is, fundamentally unfair) -although the forum
state can choose the self-restraint of exercising less than its full adjudi-
catory authority.5'
The treaty's impact would be greatest on jurisdictional law. This
impact, however, should be welcome, because the need for jurisdic-
tional reform is great. Before exploring the treaty's potential impact,
this Article will sketch the need for reform in connection with each of
the three key aspects of jurisdictional law: power, unreasonableness,
and self-restraint.
A. Inappropriateness of Power
The critical defect in the U.S. law of territorial jurisdiction is the
persistence of the power test. Through criticism of the role of power
in U.S. jurisdictional law, this Article will further describe the doc-
trine. The power test creates five different problems.
First, the power test is unjustified in terms of rationale. As traced
in the next three paragraphs, the rationale has changed with time
from an arid sovereignty theory to an instrumentalistjurisdictional al-
location and then to a redundant fairness concern.
The United States, prompted by the inherent tensions among
states in a federation, early adopted a theory of exclusive power based
on territoriality. The theory originated with the seventeenth-century
Dutch theorist Ulric Huber, who contended that each sovereign had
jurisdiction, exclusive of all other sovereigns' jurisdictions, to bind
49 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 482(1) (1987).
50 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 968-
74 (3d ed. 1996).
51 For a synopsis of basic U.S. jurisdictional law, see generally KEVIN M. CLERMONT,
CMIL PROCEDURE 142-66 (5th ed. 1999), and KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CrVIL PROCEDURE: TERRI-
TORIALJURISDIGrION AND VENUE 1-25 (1999).
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persons and things present within its territorial boundaries. 52 How-
ever, the principal thrust of the U.S. power theory was not authoriza-
tion, not a delineation of the outer bounds of actual sovereign power.
True, courts used the theory to justify nonrecognition ofjudgments of
foreign courts lacking jurisdiction. More significantly, though, courts
used the theory to impose self-limitation, to specify when the sover-
eign should choose not to exercise its actual power. After all, any full
sovereign had the raw power to adjudicate any dispute when and how
it pleased, as well as the power to enforce its adjudication on persons
and things over which it eventually acquired physical power. Yet, sov-
ereigns did not act this way. Jurisdictional law was a limit on how far
the sovereign would reach to exercise its existing power, a limit im-
posed not only in the hope that other sovereigns would restrain them-
selves similarly, but also increasingly with the intuition that such
restraint was fair. In other words, the power theory never linked to
raw power, but served merely as a metaphorical label for jurisdictional
actualities. Accordingly, power was never the true rationale of U.S.
jurisdiction in any realistic sense. The true rationale was always the
desirable allocation of jurisdictional authority.53
With time, U.S. courts came to-think openly of power as an odd
label for tlhe rough pursuit of some unclear notion of reciprocal sover-
eignty, the notion that State 1 would not reach far into State 2's do-
main in exchange for State 2's restraint in analogous cases.54 The
rationale thus became more instrumentalist, aimed directly at a desir-
able allocation of jurisdiction. Eventually, however, the Supreme
Court explicitly abandoned this instrumentalist rationale of jurisdic-
tional allocation, ruling that sovereigns' interests do not reside in the
Due Process Clause or in the jurisdictional doctrine, which the defen-
dant might elect not to raise.55 Instead, the Court shifted the due
process power test onto the individual's liberty interest in not being
subject to the illegitimate power of a foreign sovereign. 56
The continuing difficulty is that the power test as now applied
does not try to map the limits of the sovereign's power over the indi-
vidual, whatever they might be. Instead, the power test requires the
individual's tacit consent to jurisdiction and tends to find this consent
52 See James Weinstein, The Dutch Influence on the Conception of Judicial Jurisdiction in
19th Century America, 38 Am. J. CoMp. L. 73, 74-85 (1990) (discussing Huber's De Conflictu
Legum of 1684); see alsoJames Weinstein, The Early American Origins of Territoriality in Judicial
Jurisdiction, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1 (1992) (applying historical lessons to transient
jurisdiction).
53 See Strauss, supra note 42, at 1250-63.
54 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-94 (1980).
55 See Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
& n.10 (1982).
56 See id. at 702 ("[Thejurisdictional requirement] represents a restriction on judicial
power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.").
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when fair.57 The power test seems ill designed to serve such a fairness
rationale. A reasonableness test serves it more clearly.
Second, the highly conceptual power test naturally begets concep-
tual quagmires. For instance, despite the undeniable fact that all ac-
tions really affect the interests of people, the image of power
inevitably raised the question of power over whom or what. That is, to
measure the strength of the power relation between the sovereign and
the target of the action, the law had to specify the target of the action.
Thus arose the categorization of territorial jurisdiction into jurisdic-
tion over persons and things.58
Having established these categories of territorial jurisdiction, the
U.S. courts elaborated the various bases of jurisdiction within each
category. A basis provided the requisite power in the particular cate-
gory, such as personal jurisdiction's bases of physical presence, domi-
cile, consent, and forum-directed acts. When the dust finally settled,
the common element among the various bases emerged as a require-
ment that the relation of the target of the action to the sovereign con-
stitute at least "minimum contacts."59 The defining feature of this
inquiry into power is its focus on the target of the action, or more
particularly on the target's contacts with the sovereign, as opposed to
a broader inquiry that would take account of the plaintiffs or the pub-
lic's interests.
The power test has led to a whole series of pseudorules within
each jurisdictional basis, which manage to be complicated, yet fail to
work as true rules. Illustratively, loose play is evident in the proposi-
tion that power exists over an individual or corporation by virtue of
forum-directed acts for claims arising out of its local transaction of
business, tortious acts, property ownership or use, or litigating acts
such as commencement of a suit. This pseudorule leaves everything
to case-by-case adjudication. Also, the power test has led to barren
conceptual approaches to the other bases of jurisdiction. The ex-
cesses and irrelevancies of fictional consent provide an example. 60
Third, the power test remains undefinable and hence difficult to
apply. It never produced exclusive jurisdiction. The power test's mul-
tiple bases rendered impossible any jurisdictional exclusivity: one sov-
ereign might have personal jurisdiction because of the defendant's
presence or the local effects of the defendant's acts, while another
57 See Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L.
Rxv. 529, 534-50 (1991).
58 See generally R.STATEmENT OF JUDGMENTS introductory note to ch. 1, at 5-9 (1942).
59 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
60 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977) (suggesting that acceptance of
a directorship could constitute consent to jurisdiction).
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sovereign might also have personal jurisdiction based on the defen-
dant's domicile or consent to jurisdiction.
As one state's territorial jurisdiction more evidently came to over-
lap other states', the power test also became increasingly abstract. In-
stead of looking only to physical presence, courts looked to the in-
state effects of the defendant's acts or even to the quality and nature
of the acts. 61 More and more obviously, the several bases for personal
jurisdiction invoked sovereign power in only a metaphorical sense:
minimum contacts, which would satisfy the power test, existed when-
ever the defendant's activities constituted purposeful availment of the
benefits and protections of the forum's laws. 62 This elaboration
evolved uncontrollably far beyond physical power. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court has come to require "a sufficient connection between
the defendant and the forum State to make it fair to require defense
of the action in the forum."63 This inquiry into the fairness of exercis-
ing power over the defendant must turn on the interests of others;
therefore, the power test is inevitably eroding into a reasonableness
test. In fact, the Court recently has gone even further, observing that
fairness "considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonable-
ness ofjurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than
would otherwise be required."6 This subversive observation could
spell the demise of the power- test. For the present, the power test
remains a complicated way station, and it yields unpredictable results.
Fourth, the would-be predictable power test remains somewhat
inflexible, achieving any suppleness only through obscurity. The power
test oddly manages to be both undefinable and inflexible by placing
its slippery minimum contacts standard within a rigid doctrinal frame-
work. Its limited lists of categories and bases, and also concepts like
the split between general and specific jurisdiction, supply the rigidity.
Consequently, the power test readily can respond neither to the socio-
economic-political impulses that push jurisdiction, nor to simple case
variety. Its reactions have been clumsy and costly, necessitating com-
plicated doctrinal adjustments to stretch or shrink jurisdictional
reach.65
The need for flexible reaction to change is considerable in the
jurisdictional realm. Throughout history, jurisdiction has evolved
61 See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766
(Ill. 1961) (upholding jurisdiction based on the stream of commerce).
62 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
63 Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978).
64 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (Brennan, J.).
65 See Paul D. Carrington & James A. Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of
State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REv. 227, 228-30 (1967) (describing the evolution ofjurisdictional
law); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv.
241, 272-81 (reviewing the ebbs and flows of the power theory).
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largely in response to socio-economic-political pressures, as well as to
changes in technology and even philosophy. 6  Evolving societies, in-
termeshing economies, and shifting politics have compelled the
courts not only to multiply the categories and bases of power, but also
to stretch and contract them.67 Many aspects of life's complexities
have affected the evolution of jurisdiction. The development of the
business corporation, like the arrival of the automobile, had an earth-
shaking impact on jurisdiction.68 The revolutions in transportation
and communication have increased the frequency of long-distance
disputes, but simultaneously have decreased the burden of long-dis-
tance litigating.69 The twentieth century's philosophical shift from
laissez-faire to social-welfare has favored plaintiffs' desire for long ju-
risdictional reach, yet a more recent pro-business outlook has pro-
duced cutbacks to protect defendants from litigiousness.7 0
Truistically, the only constant is change.
Fifth, the determinative drawback of the power test is that it gives
self-evidently wrong answers, whether applied as a sufficient or as a
necessary condition. On the one hand, power always has existed over
a defendant passing through the sovereign's territory, and so U.S. law
apparently persists in upholding transient jurisdiction over a defen-
dant flying through the forum's air space.71 Such jurisdiction could
be unfair to the defendant. On the other hand, the power test can aid
a defendant by defeating jurisdiction over corporate officials in the
state of incorporation when their alleged breach of fiduciary duty oc-
curred out-of-state.7 2 This application of the power test ignores the
interests of states and persons other than the defendants.
B. Uncertainty of Unreasonableness
The United States Supreme Court's landmark case of Pennoyer v.
Neff 3 in 1878 imposed the power theory on the states, choosing as the
source of its authority the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
66 SeeJoseph J. Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionaiy Process: The Development of Quasi In
Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978 DuKE LJ. 1147, 1150-62 (chronicling the influence of
credit dependency on jurisdiction in early colonial America).
67 See Carrington & Martin, supra note 65, at 228-30; Hazard, supra note 65, at 272-81.
68 See Carrington & Martin, supra note 65, at 228-29.
69 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980)
("'[P]rogress in communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit in a
foreign tribunal less burdensome.'" (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51
(1958))).
70 See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
71 See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 44445 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
72 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213-17 (1977). For other examples of the
impedient power test, see supra note 38 and infra note 82.
73 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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Amendment.7 4 That choice was another step in undermining the
power theory, however, as due process notions irresistibly have pushed
the courts to consider fairness. Indeed, this impulse has been all the
more powerful because the courts have elaborated the U.S. law of ter-
ritorial jurisdiction largely on the interstate level, where fair treatment
of U.S. defendants possesses a natural appeal.
The end result of this jurisdictional elaboration has been the
overlaying of an unreasonableness test onto the power test, as the
Supreme Court did in the classic case of International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington7 5 in 1945. The test of unreasonableness balances the opposing
parties' interests, along with the public's interests in the litigation. 76 It
also takes into account a diverse and complete set of relevant consid-
erations, such as the actualities of the choice-of-law process. Although
rather uncertain in application, this party-neutral and all-things-con-
sidered test directly measures jurisdiction by the pertinent standard of
"fair play and substantial justice"7 7-the minimal floor of fundamen-
tal fairness.
Therefore, for a U.S. court to uphold territorial jurisdiction to-
day, it must apply both tests. The tests are cumulative in the sense
that power must exist and its exercise must not be unreasonable. The
Supreme Court has ruled that while the plaintiff has the burden of
persuasion as to power, it is up to the opponent to show unreasonable-
ness.78 To reflect this burden of persuasion, the test is here called the
unreasonableness test rather than the reasonableness test.
The unreasonableness test might be undefinable with any real pre-
cision, but it offers some offsetting benefits. These benefits contrast
with the power test's corresponding shortcomings. First, the unrea-
sonableness test embodies the readily justified rationale of fundamen-
tal fairness. Second, the unreasonableness test remains conceptually
straightforward.79 The subdivision into categories of jurisdiction over
persons and things is not necessary in applying the unreasonableness
test. True, there might be circumstances in which it would not be
unreasonable to cut off a nonresident's interest in local land, but it
would be unreasonable to render a money judgment against the non-
resident. Yet this difference is the outcome of balancing all factors,
including the relief at stake, with no need to label or to treat the for-
mer as in rem and the latter as in personam. Additionally, the unrea-
sonableness test has not produced complicated accretions of case law
74 See id. at 722-23.
75 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
76 See id. at 320.
77 Id.; see also Clermont, supra note 1, at 451-52.
78 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985).
79 See Clermont, supra note 1, at 453.
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analogous to the bases of power. The courts have decided many cases
that give meaning to the unreasonableness standard, but the case law
does so by dividing the mountain of cases into the two piles of reason-
able and unreasonable, rather than creating a complex set of
pseudorules. Third, flexible application is the hallmark of the unrea-
sonableness test, as it readily relaxes or tightens in response to socio-
economic-political pressures and technological and philosophical
changes.8 0 This free-form test can adjust effortlessly to changing times
and changing needs. In brief, conceptual baggage is not its problem.
Fourth, the unreasonableness test, acting in accord with its fairness
rationale, produces results that appear right.
Why, then, has the power test not withered away, leaving in its
place some sort of reasonableness test? The reason is that courts con-
tinue to hope that the power test will mitigate the uncertainty of a
case-specific fairness test. Courts remain strangely hopeful, despite
the experience of centuries proving that the power test itself always
has been highly uncertain in application, and despite the evident in-
stability of the current jurisdictional doctrine.
Is the current unreasonableness test in fact fatally infected by the
evil of uncertainty? Initially, one should bear in mind that complete
certainty is unachievable. Moreover, one should remember that cer-
tainty is never the only goal. With that said, the uncertainty of the
unreasonableness test is neither severe nor undesirable. On the one
hand, the test is not all that uncertain, as courts through their many
decisions have given it definite meaning in all but unusual cases. 81
On the other hand, the unreasonableness test should not be wholly
certain. It is a constitutional limitation after all, and thus should im-
pose a flexible outer boundary that prevents jurisdictional excess in
particular, unforeseeable circumstances. The Constitution is not the
place to seek certainty. Law should seek certainty by subconstitutional
regulation, short of the constitutional outer limits. In concrete terms,
legislators should specify that suit be brought only in the more conve-
nient, efficient, and otherwise desirable of all the reasonable forums.
Moreover, courts should not routinely reach all the way to the limits of
due process, just as they do not punish to the point of cruel and unu-
sual punishment. Courts should operate safely distant from outer lim-
its by applying the legislative restraints on jurisdiction.
Here, indeed, is a crucial point. The truly troubling type of un-
certainty occurs when outsiders cannot determine when they are
safely beyond jurisdictional reach. They then cannot shape their pri-
mary behavior to ensure that they will not have to travel to defend
80 See id.
81 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue
Preclusion and Related Problems, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 564, 571-72 (1981).
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themselves. Due process and jurisdictional law should work to protect
the outsiders from unfair jurisdiction and also from this type of uncer-
tainty. Consider the two constitutional tests. The unreasonableness
test does not generate this type of uncertainty as to inclusion within
jurisdiction. Albeit rarely called upon, this test protects the outsiders
from exorbitant jurisdiction. It functions as a backup test to block
jurisdiction when, in a particular case, the power test and any other
jurisdictional rules permit a fundamentally unfair exercise ofjurisdic-
tion. It thereby might create some uncertainty, but only in the nature
and to the extent of its exclusion from jurisdiction. In contrast, the
power test produces the costly type of uncertainty-uncertainty of in-
clusion rather than exclusion-as a result of its fuzzy outer limits. If
uncertainty is an evil, the power test surely aggravates it now and will
never overcome it. Deliverance lies in clear legislative, rather than
constitutional, regulation of territorial authority to adjudicate.
In summary, the U.S. constitutional law on jurisdiction, which
combines the power and the unreasonableness tests, is complicated
and uncertain. Moreover, it does not do an optimal job of distribut-
ing cases on a geographic basis. This situation comes as no surprise.
The limits and failures of the current constitutional doctrine demon-
strate that the Supreme Court has tried to do too much in shaping the
law of territorial jurisdiction out of the few bare words of a constitu-
tional clause. Nothing in the Court's raw material-the Constitution,
subject to judicial interpretation-can generate a set of criteria that
would be both sensible and certain. Legislative regulation is
necessary.
The Supreme Court should recognize its own limitations. It
should abandon the power test and apply only a reasonableness test as
the constitutional outer limit.8 2 This generalization is instructive: ap-
plying a reasonableness test is a judicial function, but implementing the
power test is a legislative function. The shift to a reasonableness test
would allow the Court to continue playing its role in policing the
states' excesses in extending their reach, while the abandonment of
the power test would represent the Court's withdrawal from the task
of allocating jurisdiction among the states.83 The former of these two
roles also might be somewhat legislative by nature, but due process
82 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950)
(applying only a reasonableness test to uphold New York'sjurisdiction for a settlement of
accounts to cut off nonresident beneficiaries' personal rights against their trustee-a
clearly desirable outcome that would be difficult to reach under today's power test). The
Court in Mullane abandoned the power test and accordingly refused to categorize the ac-
tion. However, the Court never again applied this futuristic approach.
83 See Stephen Goldstein, Federalism and Substantive Due Process: A Comparative and His-
torical Perspective on International Shoe and Its Progeny, 28 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 965, 968-69
(1995).
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jurisprudence has given this function of protecting individual rights to
the courts. This role conforms to the traditional and proper one for
the Court in applying the Due Process Clause. The latter task of allo-
cating jurisdiction falls largely in the realm of policymaking, and it has
been awkward to squeeze this function into the rubric of the Due Pro-
cess Clause.8 4 This task seems purely legislative in nature and fully in
need of legislatures' capabilities. Moreover, if the Court left to legisla-
tures the task of narrowing the choice among reasonable forums, and
if legislatures performed this task, then the remaining constitutional
limit of reasonableness could fade into the background.8 5
C. Proposal for Rationalized Subconstitutional Regulation
The United States, then, needs legislative regulation of territorial
authority to adjudicate. Legislatures, however, have thus far relied
mainly on the Constitution and the courts to supply the law of territo-
rial jurisdiction.8 6 Many long-arm statutes expressly incorporate by
reference the constitutional tests. The other long-arm statutes require
active judicial interpretation, and most often the courts have managed
to strip them of any specific guidance they might have provided.
Legislatures should therefore undertake a much more serious ef-
fort in siting cases in convenient, efficient, and otherwise desirable
courts. Preferably after wiping the jurisdiction and venue slate clean,
their statutes should set out general rules-usually siting cases at the
defendant's habitual residence or where a specific part of the events
in suit occurred 87-and should do so in the language of venue. Such
statutes should embrace a rules-based approach to territorial authority
to adjudicate and resist the allure of individualized fact-specific
analysis.88
The statutes should give outsiders clearer guidance as to which
activities will not subject them to local suit. Clearer guidance is possi-
ble, although perfect clarity is obviously an impossibility. Suggestions
84 See Clermont, supra note 1, at 446 & n.161.
85 Cf Goldstein, supra note 83, at 994-96 (arguing for a move from a "maximalist" to a
"minimalist7 reasonableness test).
86 See generally 1 ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICON IN CIVIL AcrnoNs §§ 4.01-.09 (2d ed.
1991).
87 For a suggestive specialized effort, see Carol S. Bruch, Statutory Reform of Constitu-
tional Doctrine: Fitting International Shoe to Family Law, 28 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1047 (1995).
For more general proposals, see Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Venue and Service of Process in the
Federal Courts-Suggestionsfor Reform, 7 VA m. L. REv. 608, 627-35 (1954); David P. Currie,
The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pt. 2), 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 268, 299-311
(1969); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, From State Jurisdiction to Interstate Venue 50 OR. L. Rxv. 103,
111-13 (1971).
88 As a safety valve for special cases, legislatures could retain a role for courts by au-
thorizing them to transfer a particular case's venue in the interest ofjustice, similar to that
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994). See Clermont, supra note 1, at 450 & n.186.
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that the Brussels Convention has achieved great clarity are un-
founded.8 9 It attempted to satisfy and reconcile the needs of a variety
of different countries and legal systems, using vague and simplistic for-
mulas that were sometimes poorly drafted and always expressed in
multiple languages. It has induced the complicated interplay of Euro-
pean and national laws, and it operates without the benefit of much
authoritative clarifying case law. Thus, in Europe, there is still a lot of
litigating about where to litigate. 90 After all, jurisdictional problems
remain problems because they are hard problems. Nevertheless, intel-
ligent reform can nudge the law on the spectrum toward certainty.
The new legislation on U.S. jurisdictional law should provide
greater restraint as well as greater certainty. The need for restraint
exists because basic fairness is at stake, and choice of forum has a tre-
mendous impact on outcome. At least the practitioners know that fo-
rum-shopping is the name of the game. Litigants expend vast
amounts of time and money on the fight over forum. Why? Because
the forum affects the chances of winning, and hence the value of set-
tlement. Accordingly, legislatures should seek to create a fair law of
territorial jurisdiction.
Recent empirical work on transfer of venue91 and removal92
shows that the majority of practitioners are not acting irrationally.
Utilizing a database of the three million civil cases terminated in the
federal district courts over recent years, the research shows, for exam-
ple, that the plaintiffs' rate of winning drops from 58% ofjudgments
in cases where there was no transfer to 29% in transferred cases.93
That is to say, plaintiffs win much more often when they get to choose
the forum.
Admittedly, transferred cases are very different in kind from non-
transferred cases. Grouping together transferred cases results in a
concentration of cases that are hard to win against apparently aggres-
89 See C.GJ. Morse, International Shoe v. Brussels and Lugano: Principles and Pitfalls in
the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 28 U.C. DAvis L. Rv. 999, 1012-25 (1995). But see, e.g.,
Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and the European Com-
muniy: Lessons forAmerican Reform, 40 AM.J. COMP. L. 121 (1992) (arguing that the Brussels
Convention creates clarity and that U.S. jurisdictional law could benefit from emulating
the Convention by legislation).
90 See Morse, supra note 89, at 1010-12.
91 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping;
80 CORNELL L. REv. 1507 (1995) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Forum-Shopping]; Ke-
vin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Simplifying the Choice of Forum: A Reply, 75 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1551 (1997).
92 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Any-
thingAbout the Legal System? Win Rates and RemovalJurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 581, 606-
07 (1998) (showing that removal from state to federal court reduces a 50% chance of the
plaintiff's winning to 39%, a comparable "forum effect" that reflects the plaintiffs loss of
forum advantage).
93 See Clermont & Eisenberg, Forum-Shopping, supra note 91, at 1511-13.
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sive defendants, partly explaining the drop in win rate. However, the
observed effect of a dropping win rate prevails across the range of
substantively different types of cases. Moreover, the statistical tech-
nique of regression helps to isolate the effect of transfer on outcome.
Controlling for case category, amount demanded, procedural devel-
opment at termination, method of disposition, and kind of subject-
matter jurisdiction, one finds that transfer persists in reducing a 50%
chance of the plaintiff's winning to 40%. 9 4
The reductive effect of transfer on the win rate is not surprising.
Transferred cases comprise those cases where the forum advantage
would be the greatest. After all, the plaintiff had tried to forum-shop,
the defendant had chosen to fight back, and the court in granting
transfer had decided that the forum really mattered. The transferred
plaintiffs lost the forum advantage and thus litigated less successfully
in the unfavorable forum against the defendants. The win rate, there-
fore, dropped. This effect of transfer, as shown on judgments, influ-
ences all nonjudgment settlements and other resolutions. The forum
does matter, apparently not so much because of choice of law as be-
cause of strongly shifting inconveniences and changing biases.
There is a normative lesson here, too. Given the nature of trans-
fer, the transferee forum is usually a more just forum giving a more
accurate outcome. Transfer removes the plaintiff's forum advantage
when the "interest ofjustice" so counsels,95 and therefore removes the
plaintiff's opportunity to gain an unjust victory in litigation or to
achieve an unjust settlement. Transfer works to neutralize any lop-
sided cost advantage and thereby to equalize the effectiveness of the
two sides' litigation expenditures. Thus, the outcome should be more
accurate in the transferee court. Note that transfer does not shift the
choice of forum from plaintiff to defendant, but instead from plaintiff
to judge. Moreover, the judge decides to transfer only in rather ex-
treme cases of forum-shopping, normally deferring to the presump-
tion in favor of the plaintiffs selected forum. In short, the transferee
forum generally should be a better forum affording a better outcome.
In brief, forum matters, in terms of outcome and justice. Conse-
quently, plaintiffs frequently choose a forum to obtain an advantage-
if only to sue at home, as they often do. Transfer offsets the advan-
tage, but transfer occurs only in 1% to 2% of federal civil cases.
Therefore, plaintiffs sometimes manage to forum-shop their way to
victory. As a result, an unfilled role exists for a robust law of territorial
authority to adjudicate, which should ensure that the plaintiff is
choosing initially from a limited list of fair forums.
94 See id. at 1518-25 & n.39.
95 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994).
1999]
HeinOnline -- 85 Cornell L. Rev. 109 1999-2000
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Note that all of the foregoing discussion on the importance of
forum concerned litigation within the United States. Consider now
international litigation. The choice of forum becomes much more
important. Shifting inconveniences and changing biases from a local
forum to a foreign forum become staggeringly effective in determin-
ing outcome. Moreover, the international differences in substantive
and procedural law, as well as the differences in remedies and ex-
penses, dwarf the small variations within U.S. law. What is the forum's
law on antitrust, will there be a jury, how big will be the award of
damages and will they be trebled, and can the plaintiffs lawyer pro-
ceed on a contingent fee and will the loser have to pay the winner's
expenses? Because of all the different answers to these questions,
each nation's legal system really needs to worry about the law of terri-
torial jurisdiction.
In sum, because the choice of forum can affect a case's just out-
come and because the plaintiff currently has a wide choice, lawmakers
should take a progressively more restrictive approach to territorial au-
thority to adjudicate in both state and federal law. If the state legisla-
tures prove reluctant to restrain their own courts, then Congress
could intercede to legislate general limits on the states' interstate and
international reach by utilizing its powers under the Due Process
Clause, Full Faith and Credit Clause, and Commerce Clause,96 not to
mention its powers with respect to foreign relations. 97 Moreover, on
the international level the United States should continue to pursue a
multilateral treaty that would provide both restraint and certainty.
D. Salvation via Treaty
1. International Law
If the United States accepts a Hague judgments and jurisdiction
treaty similar to the Brussels Convention, it would take a giant step on
the international level toward the reform proposed in this Article.
The treaty would succeed in downplaying the due process tests by gen-
erally satisfying them comfortably through its restrained and fairly cer-
tain subconstitutional regulation.
96 See Borchers, supra note 89, at 154-55; PatrickJ. Borchers, The Death of the Constitu-
tional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIs
L. REv. 19, 104-05 & nn.542-43 (1990); Clermont, supra note 1, at 442 n.139; Israel Packel,
Congressional Power to Reduce Personal Jurisdiction Litigation, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 919 (1986) (dis-
cussing the Commerce Clause); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-
Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due
Process Clauses (pts. 1 & 2), 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 499, 735 (1981).
97 See PatrickJ. Borchers, Judgments Conventions and Minimum Contacts, 61 ALB. L. REv.
1161, 1164-66 (1998).
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a. Judgments. A Hague treaty appears quite desirable for the
treatment of foreign judgments.98 The United States would get re-
turns for the respect it is already according other nations' judgments.
An obvious concern with a multilateral treaty is that it might force
the United States to respect distasteful foreign judgments. The
United States is confident about sister-state judgments, but there the
Due Process Clause applies, with the United States Supreme Court to
review its application. Perhaps the United States could muster confi-
dence in the judgments of a small number of like-minded legal sys-
tems-a confidence similar to that displayed by the European Union
countries in their Brussels Convention, which was part of a much
broader unification project.99 A worldwide treaty, however, is alto-
gether another matter. The United States could not be sure of the
fundamental fairness of all foreign judgments. Accordingly, the treaty
must have, and will have, a provision giving each signatory country
broad control over which countries can sign on vis-a.-vis that coun-
try,' 00 as well as narrowly drawn public-policy exceptions for proce-
dural due process violations and other repugnancies. 1°1
More massive and probably more troubling than the judgment
provisions' effect is the treaty's impact on the jurisdictional side. 10 2
The treaty would take the specification of jurisdictional reach partly
out of U.S. hands and deliver it into the embrace of international law.
This Article now turns to the details of that change.
b. GeneralJurisdiction. A Hague treaty likely would mean that the
United States would abandon transience, attachment, and doing busi-
ness as bases for general jurisdiction on the international level among
signatory countries. The Europeans argue that the contacts of the de-
fendant's physical presence, property ownership, or doing business in
the forum are too thin to allow bringing any and all causes of action.
The Europeans are right on that point.
Transient, or tag, jurisdiction 03 has long enjoyed judicial approval
in the United States, and it is constitutional, as long as its application
is not so outlandish that it is unreasonable in the particular circum-
stances. 10 4 However, it also has long been the recipient of criticism
98 See Treaty Draft, supra note 32, ch. iii.
99 But see Brussels Convention, supra note 3, art. 27(1), reprinted as amended in 29
I.L.M. at 1424 (providing nonrecognition "if such recognition is contrary to public policy
in the State in which recognition is sought").
100 See Treaty Outline, supra note 32, art. 40; 1998 Synthesis, supra note 32, at 46-47.
101 See Treaty Draft supra note 32, art. 27bis(1); 1998 Synthesis, supra note 32, at 20-21;
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Thoughts About a MultinationalJudgments Convention: A Reaction to the
von Mehren Report, IAw & Coump. PROBS., Summer 1994, at 289, 291-92.
102 See Treaty Draft, supra note 32, ch. ii.
1o3 See supra note 13.
104 See LAWRENCE W. NEWMAN & ICHAEL BuRRoWs, THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
LTmGATION at 1-120 to -121 (2d ed. 1999); see also Sarieddine v. Moussa, 820 S.W.2d 837, 840
1999]
HeinOnline -- 85 Cornell L. Rev. 111 1999-2000
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
from academics and foreigners alike. 10 5 Formerly the most important
basis of U.S. jurisdiction, but today far from essential, it is occasionally
used to sue foreigners in the United States, even though the resulting
judgments would be unlikely to receive recognition or enforcement
abroad.' 0 6 Indeed, transient jurisdiction is necessary only when the
appropriate bases of jurisdiction are unavailing.
Given transient jurisdiction's dubious propriety and general un-
necessariness, the United States should be, and seems to be, willing to
accept the treaty's prohibition. 0 7  Perhaps, however, the United
States should insist on a new provision for jurisdiction against ter-
rorists and human rights violators, against whom the human rights
community has relied on tag jurisdiction.108
Attachment jurisdiction'0 9 also was formerly quite useful. If the
plaintiff had any claim against the defendant but failed to acquire per-
sonaljurisdiction, the plaintiff could proceed against any of the defen-
dant's property within the state, such as a bank account. Upon
attachment, the defendant usually defaulted and the resulting judg-
ment allowed the plaintiff to apply the property to satisfy the claim.
The plaintiff could later bring a separate suit on any unsatisfied por-
tion of the claim, either in personam or again by this subtype of quasi
in rem jurisdiction against other property.
(Tex. App. 1991) (rejecting implicitly the minority opinion ofJustice Scalia in Burnham v.
Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 607 (1990), which had suggested that transient jurisdiction
merely by its historical pedigree always satisfies the unreasonableness test).
105 See BoRN, supra note 50, at 121-23; MATHiAS RIsmAI, CoNrcr oF LAws IN WEST-
ERN EUROPE 78 (1995) (explaining that most Western European countries do not recog-
nize transient jurisdiction); Stephen B. Burbank, The United States'Approach to International
Civil Litigation: Recent Developments in Forum Selection, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 13-14, 18
(1998); Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially over International Defendants: Critical Com-
ments on Burnhamn v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 593, 599-601; Rus-
sell J. Weintraub, An Objective Basis for Rejecting Transient Jurisdiction, 22 RUrGERS LJ. 611,
618-16 (1991); Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Status of American Law in the Hague Judgments
Convention Project, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1283, 1296-97 (1998) (explaining that transientjurisdic-
tion conflicts with international standards).
106 SeeDAVID EPSTEIN &JEFFREY L. SNM)ER, INTERNATONAL LrrIGATION § 6.04[3] (2d ed.
1994); LouIsE ELLEN TErrz, TRANSNATIONAL LITIATION § 1-6, at 50-52 (1996).
107 See Treaty Draft, supra note 32, art. 20(2) (f) (prohibiting jurisdiction based on "the
service of a writ upon the defendant in that State"); id. art. 20 (2) (i); Weintraub, supra note
28, at 189-90; Russell J. Weintraub, Negotiating the Tort Long-Arm Provisions of the Judgments
Convention, 61 ALB. L. Rv. 1269, 1278-79 (1998).
108 See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 248 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that an invitee
of the United Nations is not immune from personal service of process); 1998 Synthesis,
supra note 32, at 30 n.53. Perhaps the treaty should cut the tie to tag jurisdiction and
instead provide for jurisdiction over such wrongdoers, as well as other kinds of elusive
individual and corporate defendants, under the rubric ofjurisdiction by necessity. See infra
text accompanying note 122. Or the treaty could skirt this problem by permitting nations
to exercise such jurisdiction under a so-called mixed convention. See Treaty Draft supra
note 32, art. 20(4); infra text accompanying note 142.
109 See supra note 14.
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In the course of history, attachment jurisdiction facilitated the in-
dustrialization of America. °10 Today the needs that generated it are
much less intense, because personal jurisdiction has expanded. Nev-
ertheless, the courts wastefully have had to work out the doctrinal im-
plications and complications and to control the abuses allowed by this
ancient form ofjurisdiction. The result has been many years of criti-
cism of attachment jurisdiction.
In the leading case of Shaffer v. Heitner"' in 1977, the Supreme
Court made clear that nonpersonaljurisdiction also must pass the un-
reasonableness test, thereby meeting the criticism but minimizing the
usefulness of attachment jurisdiction." 2 Under this test, mere pres-
ence of some bit of the defendant's property is not enough to render
reasonable the entertaining of a claim totally unrelated to the at-
tached property, even if the defendant's liability were limited to the
value of that property. Something more-an adequate relation of the
forum, the parties, and the litigation-has to exist before a court will,
in its subjective opinion, deem an exercise ofjurisdiction to be funda-
mentally fair.
The result of Shaffer is that this subtype of quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion is now available only in four rather special situations. In the fol-
lowing examples of those situations, attachmentjurisdiction would be
reasonable and hence constitutional in the situs forum, which hypo-
thetically is New York:
1) An Ohio plaintiff sues by attaching an Iowa defendant's land in
New York in order to secure a judgment being sought by the plain-
tiff in California for personal injuries stemming from a traffic acci-
dent with the defendant in California.1 3
2) An Ohio plaintiff sues by attaching an Iowa defendant's land in
New York in order to enforce a judgment already rendered for the
plaintiff in California for personal injuries stemming from a traffic
accident with the defendant in California.114
3) An Ohio plaintiff sues by attaching an Iowa defendant's land in
New York in order to recover for personal injuries stemming from a
traffic accident with the defendant in New York. If a state constitu-
tionally could exercise personal jurisdiction, it may choose to allow
the plaintiff to cast suit in the form of attachment jurisdiction. 1 15
110 See Kalo, supra note 66, at 1159-62.
I'1 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
112 See id. at 207-12.
113 See id. at 210; Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044, 1048-49
(N.D. Cal. 1977). New York might require legislative authorization of any particular form
ofjurisdiction, and its legislature has not in fact authorized this sort of anticipatory attach-
ment. See DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YoRK PRACrICE § 104, at 177 (3d ed. 1999).
114 See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 210 n.36; Biel v. Boehm, 406 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
115 See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208 & n.29; LAWRENCE W. NEwvmAN & DAVID ZASLONVSKY,
LmGATING INTERNATIONAL COMmRCuL DIsPurEs 35 (1996). Arguably, the Privileges and
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4) An Ohio plaintiff sues by attaching a French defendant's prop-
erty in New York in order to recover for personal injuries stemming
from a traffic accident with the defendant in Japan. Attachment
jurisdiction in New York is thought to be constitutional, if p rsonal
jurisdiction is not available in any other U.S. forum. 116 This situa-
tion would be a surviving example of so-called jurisdiction by neces-
sity, in which the unavailability of an alternative U.S. forum helps
make attachment jurisdiction reasonable. Other factors could help
to establish reasonableness, such as the need of the plaintiff or some
link between the cause of action and the attached property. Power
is no problem, because the property is present in New York.
Attachmentjurisdiction in the first or second situation is perfectly
appropriate, and accordingly the treaty would authorize this jurisdic-
tion for security" 7 and enforcement."" Nonpersonal jurisdiction in
the third situation becomes completely unnecessary once the sover-
eign extends personal jurisdiction to appropriate lengths." 9 Finally,
jurisdiction in the fourth situation remains constitutionally shaky. It
receives regular criticism, although it actually sees little use.120 The
United States should be, and seems to be, willing to surrender that
use. 12' Perhaps the United States should push for a safety clause nar-
rowly authorizing jurisdiction by necessity, but probably this ill-devel-
oped concept remains too vague for introduction into an
international convention' 22
A more controversial jurisdictional basis is doing business 2 3-a pe-
culiarly U.S. doctrine1 24 that establishes general jurisdiction over a de-
fendant who extensively conducts continuous and systematic activities
within the forum. It entails terrible problems of line-drawing and
does not conform to the usual rationale of generaljurisdiction.' 2 5 Be-
Immunities Clause of the Constitution prohibits actual seizure solely for this unnecessary
formalism. See Richard W. Bourne, The Demise of Foreign Attachment, 21 CREIGHTON L. REv.
141, 191-95 (1987).
116 See Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273, 1278-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (approv-
ing such jurisdiction after Shaffer); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § 66 cmt.
d (1969) (amended 1988); cf. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211 n.37 (leaving the constitutional ques-
tion open).
117 See Treaty Draft, supra note 32, art. 14(2).
118 See id. art. 20(3) (c) (listing enforcement as a permitted basis).
119 See Michael B. Mushlin, The New Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction: New York's Revival of a
Doctrine Whose Time Has Passed, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 1059, 1116-27 (1990).
120 See id. at 1095-96, 1100.
121 See Treaty Draft, supra note 32, art. 20(2) (a) (prohibiting general jurisdiction based
on "the presence or the seizure in that State of property belonging to the defendant");
1997 Synthesis, supra note 32, at 61 (preserving presence of property as a basis for specific
jurisdiction).
122 See 1998 Synthesis, supra note 32, at 37 (describing the general lack of enthusiasm
for a "denial ofjustice" clause).
123 See supra note 34.
124 See REIMANN, supra note 105, at 77.
125 See BORN, supra note 50, at 103-16.
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cause it requires the defendant to be so active in the forum as to seem
like a native, the doctrine is seldom properly available against a defen-
dant from abroad. 12 6 Again, this basis arose to provide appropriate
jurisdiction when specific jurisdiction was not yet fully available; but
today U.S. courts resort to it only when all appropriate bases of per-
sonaljurisdiction do not reach the defendant. 27
Given the shortcomings of doing-business jurisdiction, the
United States also should abandon this basis in the treaty.' 28 The
more common forms of activity-based jurisdiction that fall more sol-
idly within specific jurisdiction would survive, 129 and all other bases of
specific jurisdiction under the treaty also would be available. 30
Thus, general jurisdiction under the treaty likely would exist on
the sole' 3 ' basis of the defendant's habitual residence.'32 The United
States must be willing to surrender something in the negotiating pro-
cess, in order to have other countries respect U.S. judgments and re-
nounce their own exorbitant bases of jurisdiction. Those tired old
doctrines-the questionable and unnecessary doctrines of transient,
attachment, and doing-business jurisdiction-are offensive to the
Europeans, while U.S. interest groups and the United States Senate
are apt to feel only limited passion in their defense. By giving in on
126 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984)
(holding that "mere purchases, even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to
warrant a State's assertion of in personamjurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a
cause of action not related to those purchase transactions"). But see RUSSELLJ. WINTRAUB,
INTrRNATONAL LrrIGATION AND ARrrRATION 6 (2d ed. 1997) (citing questionable
counterexamples).
127 See, e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851, 854 (N.Y. 1967); see
also Weintraub, supra note 28, at 187-89 (explaining that the elimination of doing-business
jurisdiction "will block suit in only a few cases in which the United States has a legitimate
interest in providing a forum").
128 See Treaty Draft, supra note 32, art. 20(2) (e) (prohibiting general jurisdiction based
on "the carrying on of commercial or other activities by the defendant in that State"); 1998
Synthesis, supra note 32, at 29-30; Weintraub, supra note 107, at 1277-78; Zekoll, supra note
105, at 1294-95.
129 See 1998 Synthesis, supra note 32, at 30 (preserving "transacting business" as a basis
for specific jurisdiction).
130 See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 170 (describing consumer-contract
jurisdiction).
131 The United States also authorizes general jurisdiction based on the defendant's
status as a U.S. citizen. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932) (upholding
statute giving authority to the United States to exercise jurisdiction over an absent citizen
who fails to obey a subpoena); BoPN, supra note 50, at 95-99. In accordance with the trend
in international law, the treaty might, and should, eliminate this rarely used basis. See
Treaty Draft, supra note 32, art. 20(2) (c); 1997 Synthesis, supra note 32, at 61-63.
132 See Treaty Draft, supra note 32, art. 3; E.M. Clive, The Concept of Habitual Residence,
1997JumD. REv. 137 (defining habitual residence); Hay, supra note 105, at 600 n.56. The
treaty will not define habitual residence, but the treaty's autonomous law will govern the
question. For a corporation, the treaty will authorize general jurisdiction where it is incor-
porated or has its statutory seat, central administration, or principal place of business. See
Treaty Draft, supra note 32, art. 3.
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general jurisdiction, the United States also could gain bargaining
power on specific jurisdiction, which is worth arguing over.
c. Specific Jurisdiction. The Europeans do not object to specific
jurisdiction. Thus, jurisdiction under a Hague treaty would exist
where a specific part of the events in suit occurred. The battle is over
the exact terms. Admittedly, the drafting task is complicated, but that
only proves the need for the effort. The exercise of specifying which
of the constitutional forums are the more convenient, efficient, and
otherwise desirable would do a great service to U.S. law. In addition,
learning more about foreign thinking on jurisdictional matters could
have only a salutary effect on the shape of U.S. law.
The adoption of a new U.S. mindset is the key to a successful
negotiating process. Instead of assuming that plaintiffs are entitled to
all empowered forums that are not fundamentally unfair to the de-
fendants, the U.S. negotiators should try to specify only the more con-
venient, efficient, and otherwise desirable of all those forums. That is,
they should not try to track precisely the outer limits of due process,
but instead should provide merely a short menu of forums with which
the world can live. Moreover, they should specify the menu in terms
sufficiently clear in order to reduce the high expenditure of resources
on forum selection.
Consider jurisdiction for tort cases as an illustration. 133 The
treaty might authorize jurisdiction at the place
(a) in which the act or omission that caused injury occurred; or
(b) in which the injury arose, unless the defendant establishes
that [it] could not reasonably have foreseen that the act or omission
could result in an injury of the same nature in that State.' 34
This proposed language is a giant step beyond the Brussels Conven-
tion's "where the harmful event occurred,"13 5 a provision that failed to
foresee even the possible separation between the place of the act and
the place of the injury.'3 6 The Hague treaty's proposed language
seems to be a decent compromise among different countries' mod-
estly different positions.137 It approximates the current U.S. reach
133 See generally Ronald A. Brand, Tort Jurisdiction in a Multilateral Convention: The Lessons
of the Due Process Clause and the Brussels Convention, 24 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 125, 150-55 (1998)
(discussing the differences between tortjurisdiction under U.S. law and under the Brussels
Convention).
134 Treaty Draft, supra note 32, art. 10(1).
135 Brussels Convention, supra note 3, art. 5(3), reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. at
1419.
136 See Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace S.A.,
1976 E.C.R. 1735, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 284 (1976); Brand, supra note 133, at 144-50; Morse,
supra note 89, at 1024. But see Borchers, supra note 89, at 144-46 (praising the Brussels
Convention's tort provision as being clear and expansive).
137 See 1998 Synthesis, supra note 32, at 33-35; 1997 Synthesis, supra note 32, at 53-59;
Catherine Kessedjian, International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
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under the Due Process Clause, while its language still attains a fair
degree of specificity. 38 Of course, any provision with words like "act
or omission that caused"'139 will create some confusion. Further draft-
ing effort could yield greater precision, but the effort's direction thus
far appears appropriate.
Other provisions need more thought and better drafting. For ex-
ample, language such as, "[flor contracts made and performed en-
tirely by electronic means, the plaintiff may bring a claim in respect of
all his losses in the court of his domicile," simply will not do. 40 This
incredibly broad provision manages to trash both the defendant's and
the public's interests. Unfortunately, there is no alternative to some
hard work by the treatymakers here.
Finally, and not inconsistently, the resulting provisions should be
inclusive enough to relieve the pressure to distort language by expan-
sive judicial interpretation. Here, the progress to date is not encour-
aging. Huge gaps appear in the proposed treaty. For example, the
U.S. team has not pushed strongly enough to preserve the useful as-
pects of in rem and quasi in remjurisdiction that permit the adjudica-
tion of interests in a thing where the thing is located. 14' Also, the
treatymakers provide no handle on future developments. For exam-
ple, even the foreseeable changes in the intellectual property and In-
ternet fields go igored-a strategy that is especially problematic
given that the treaty would establish no supranational judicial or legis-
lative body to perform ongoing oversight.
Drafting specific jurisdiction provisions, then, remains a tall or-
der. Terms that optimize policy also must be clear and inclusive,
while they bridge the world's varying mindsets and laws. The task in-
deed would appear hopeless if the possible compromise of a so-called
mixed convention were not lurking in the background. 142 Such a con-
vention would include not only a catch-all blacklist of prohibited juris-
dictional bases and a "whitelist" of mandatory bases, but also a
"graylist" of permitted bases. A country could exercise jurisdiction to
Matters, Hague Conf. Prelim. Doe. No. 7, at 70-72, 82 (Apr. 1997); Brand, supra note 133, at
150-55; Weintraub, supra note 28, at 191-93, 199, 203 (disapproving any "purposefully di-
rected" requirement, but approving a "foreseeability" requirement).
138 See Brand, supra note 133, at 130-43.
139 Treaty Draft, supra note 32, art. 10(1)(a).
140 Treaty Outline, supra note 32, art. 6, var. 4. Encouragingly, the negotiators dropped
this proposal in the latest draft of the treaty. See Treaty Draft, supra note 32, art. 6.
141 See Weintraub, supra note 28, at 201; cf supra text accompanying notes 109-22 (ex-
plaining the treaty's restrictions on attachment jurisdiction). Compare Treaty Draft, supra
note 32, art. 13 (granting exclusive jurisdiction for actions on rights in immovable property
to the country where the property is located), with 1997 Synthesis, supra note 32, at 61
(noting the need for specific jurisdiction with respect to things). The most recent draft of
the treaty would permit these nonpersonal bases under a so-called mixed convention. See
Treaty Draft, supra note 32, art. 20(3) (a); infra text accompanying note 142.
142 See von Mehren, supra note 6, at 19. But seeJuenger, supra note 17, at 118-20.
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give judgment based on this graylist, but other countries would not
have to recognize or enforce that judgment. A mixed convention
might not go as far as a double convention in providing global uni-
formity, but this kind of a mixed convention retains the virtue of spec-
ifying U.S. bases of jurisdiction. The accepted U.S. bases would
comprise the whitelist plus the U.S.-sponsored entries on the graylist.
Even specification of a graylist might pose too great a drafting
challenge, given the time pressure. The temptation will be to supple-
ment the whitelist with a catch-all graylist, which would permit each
country to apply those of its own rules of jurisdiction not prohibited
by a specific blacklist.143 This approach greatly facilitates agreement
and probably is desirable overall, but it scuttles the treaty's function of
requiring a formulation of each signatory's jurisdictional law.
d. Discretionary Jurisdiction. The Europeans want mandatory ap-
plication of a Hague treaty's rules-based approach. They detest ex-
plicit discretion. 44 In response to this, the English surrendered
forum non conveniens upon entering the Brussels Convention. 145
The United States also should be willing to abandon the doctrine: 146
Consider in particular the doctrine of forum non conveniens in
the federal courts, which applies primarily when the preferred court is
foreign.147 The doctrine is relatively young, mainly Anglo-Ameri-
can,148 and quite troublesome. In theory, it allows a federal court dis-
cretionarily to decline existing territorial authority to adjudicate, if
the court is a seriously inappropriate forum and if a substantially more
143 See Treaty Draft, supra note 32, art. 19.
144 See REIMANN, supa note 105, at 82-85 (discussing continental law's rejection of fo-
rum non conveniens); Weintraub, supra note 28, at 210-11.
145 See supra note 26 and accompanying text; cf Friedrich K. Juenger, Judicial Control of
ImproperForum Selection: Some Random Remarks and a Comment on How Not to Do I4 in INTERNA-
TIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION OF FORUM SELECTION 311, 314 (Jack L.
Goldsmith ed., 1997) (explaining that the English "failed to insist on preserving" forum
non conveniens).
146 By contrast, when parallel proceedings are pending, the power to grant a stay
should exist.
A U.S. court under current law may stay its own proceedings in deference to another
court's pending proceedings if those related proceedings are in a more appropriate forum.
See generally BoRN, supra note 50, at 459-74. Courts created this discretionary power, which
constitutes the vague doctrine of lis pendens, as incidental to their inherent power to con-
trol their own dockets. This doctrine is very similar to forum non conveniens, albeit a bit
more readily invoked. They differ in that lis pendens requires a pending alternative and
also in that stayed proceedings can be more easily revived than dismissed proceedings.
The treaty would provide for lis pendens. See Treaty Draft, supra note 32, art. 23; 1998
Synthesis, supra note 32, at 15-16, 40-41; cf Brussels Convention, supra note 3, arts. 21-23,
reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. at 1423-24 (providing that in a situation of parallel pro-
ceedings, a subsequently seised court should stay its proceedings). The treaty's version,
however, probably would have a strict preference for the court first seised and be much
more rigid than current U.S. law. See Zekoll, supra note 105, at 1297-98.
147 See BoRN, supra note 50, at 296-97.
148 SeeJuenger, supra note 145, at 311-13.
[Vol. 85:89
HeinOnline -- 85 Cornell L. Rev. 118 1999-2000
JURISDICTIONAL SALVATION
appropriate forum is available to the plaintiff. In actual practice, how-
ever, it tends to be fatal in application. In a survey of plaintiff's law-
yers in the 180 reported transnational cases that the federal courts
dismissed from 1947 to 1984 on forum non conveniens grounds, 85
responded; of those 85, no plaintiff won in the foreign court; most
cases were either abandoned or settled for little.1 49 Now consider
three questions that the doctrine's reality raises in general.
First, considering that forum non conveniens has such a stark ef-
fect on outcome, is it fair for the court both to ignore changes in
applicable law and to dismiss on the basis of mere inconvenience, as
suggested in the Supreme Court's ill-conceived Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno'50? The answer is no. Forum non conveniens should not ex-
pand into a doctrine of inconvenience, but instead should be a doc-
trine of abuse. The courts should dismiss a suit only when the plaintiff
has so abused the privilege of forum selection that, all things consid-
ered, exercising jurisdiction would be a miscarriage ofjustice. In fact,
the lower courts seldom grant forum non conveniens dismissals, and
the judge commonly conditions any such dismissal on the defendant's
varied concessions. Perhaps, then, forum non conveniens remains in
practice just such a doctrine of abuse.
Second, if forum non conveniens is only a doctrine of abuse, what
does it contribute beyond the Constitution's unreasonableness test?
Not much other than multiplying costs and delays, increasing uncer-
tainty, and facilitating discrimination against foreigners. The pecu-
liarities of forum non conveniens often raise intricate questions,
requiring extensive investigation and research. The judicial decision
is blatantly discretionary, but the Supreme Court ambiguously has
blessed various presumptions and weights that can skew that discre-
tion away from fairness. For example, courts stress a presumption in
favor of the plaintiffs choice of forum, but only when the plaintiff is a
U.S. resident. True, some judicial flexibility in rejecting jurisdiction is
desirable, but the unreasonableness test already provides it and sub-
jects it to nondeferential appellate review.
Third, does forum non conveniens not tend to narrow the cur-
rently overbroad law of territorial authority to adjudicate? It does, but
the United States should approach the goal of narrowing territorial
reach openly and directly by legislative reform of jurisdictional and
venue rules on the federal and the state levels, rather than surrepti-
149 See David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England. "A Rather
Fantastic Fiction," 103 LAw Q. REv. 398, 418-20 (1987); see also David W. Robertson, The
Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: "An Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion, "29 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 353, 378-79 (1994) (arguing for reliable rules to temperjudicial discretion and
otherwise to narrow forum non conveniens).
150 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
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tiously and dangerously by embracing forum non conveniens. In
short, a decent jurisdictional scheme would eliminate the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. 151
Accordingly, the treaty might narrow or eliminate forum non
conveniens, despite U.S. wishes to retain it.152 Indeed, the treaty
should eliminate it. The costs of the doctrine outweigh its benefits;
and if the treaty also were to narrow general jurisdiction and refine
specific jurisdiction, any benefits of forum non conveniens would all
but disappear.
The elimination of forum non conveniens would raise the prob-
lem of how U.S. courts could avoid the mandatory exercise of unrea-
sonable jurisdiction. Would there not be an abiding need for judicial
discretion to meet this problem? The answer is no for a number of
reasons. First, the problem would seldom arise because the treaty's
jurisdictional provisions would be sufficiently restrained to stay com-
fortably within the bounds of reasonableness in almost all cases. The
main function of forum non conveniens is to mitigate the abuses of
exorbitant jurisdiction, but the treaty would handle those abuses di-
rectly by limiting jurisdictional reach. 153 Second, the court usually
would be able to avoid unreasonable jurisdiction by narrowly constru-
ing the treaty's jurisdictional provisions. The Europeans may detest
explicit discretion, for example, but even they implicitly exercise dis-
cretion by creative construction, "a little like Monsieur Jourdain in Le
Bourgeois Gentilhomme who spoke prose without knowing it."' 54 Third,
in the rarest of cases, where going forward would be fundamentally
unfair, the unreasonableness test of the Due Process Clause would res-
cue the U.S. court from exercising jurisdiction. The Constitution
prevails over treaty obligations, even when the respect for due process
would lead the United States into a breach of a treaty obligation. 55
151 See Zekoll, supra note 105, at 1297-300 (arguing that the rejection of forum non
conveniens provides legal certainty and prevents discrimination against foreigners); cf.
Currie, supra note 87, at 307 ("It would be mellow to try every action in the most conve-
nient forum. But deciding where that forum is costs altogether too much time and
money.").
152 See 1998 Synthesis, supra note 32, at 42-44; Note on the Question of Forum Non Con-
veniens" in the Perspective of a Double Convention on Judicial Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Decisions, Hague Conf. Prelim. Doc. No. 3 (Apr. 1996) [hereinafter Forum Non Conveniens];
Kessedjian, supra note 137, at 40-42; cf. CHRISTOPH DORSEL, FORUM NON CONVENIENS
(1996) (criticizing the U.S. doctrine from a European perspective). The most recent draft
of the treaty retains a narrow forum non conveniens provision. See Treaty Draft supra note
32, art. 24.
153 See Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 152, at 2-6.
154 Catherine Kessedjian, Judicial Regulation of Imp-oer Forum Selections, in INTERNA-
TIONAL DrspuTE REsOLUTION: THE REGULATION OF FORUM SELECTION, supra note 145, at
273, 290 (discussing how the Brussels Convention's tort provision may yield a result similar
to forum non conveniens); see supra text accompanying notes 135-36.
155 See infra text accompanying notes 166-76.
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The ideal solution would be for the U.S. team to insist on a provi-
sion allowing refusal of jurisdiction when forbidden by the country's
constitution, rather than on a forum non conveniens provision.
Although applicable only in very rare cases, this solution would cap-
ture the valuable core of forum non conveniens, while sidestepping
most of the treaty's constitutional difficulties.
2. Domestic Law
As beneficial as a Hague treaty on jurisdiction and judgments
could be to narrow general jurisdiction and refine specific jurisdiction
through mandatory rules, its international level remains exotic even
in today's shrinking world. Most of the jurisdictional action occurs on
the domestic front, where the need for reform is most intense. It is
this domestic front where the treaty efforts really could pay off.
On the level of domestic law, Congress could follow the Italian
model15 6 and enact the treaty's jurisdictional provisions as domestic
law.157 That is, once other major countries join the United States in a
treaty, Congress could legislate that federal and state courts possess
jurisdiction according to the criteria set out in the treaty, regardless of
whether the foreign defendant is domiciled in a signatory country.
Those criteria usually would place jurisdiction either at the defen-
dant's habitual residence or where a specific part of the events in suit
occurred. Then, all international cases in U.S. courts, or at least those
within the specified substantive types of cases the treaty encom-
passes,158 would fall under a uniform and nondiscriminatory jurisdic-
tional law. This step would require giving nonsignatory countries the
benefit of the treaty's jurisdictional provisions, but not the much
greater benefit of its provisions on recognition and enforcement of
judgments. The United States would be giving away a little, while get-
ting the benefits of a uniform jurisdictional law and avoiding the ex-
ternal and internal costs of discrimination against outsiders that the
Brussels Convention inflicts.
This relatively modest legislative step would fire the imagination,
particularly if the treaty and the federal statute are actually successful
in rationalizing practice. Good law that works simply and easily
should attract some champions. State legislatures could enact the
treaty's jurisdictional provisions as their own law or achieve the same
156 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
157 On drawing lessons from the international arena for procedure in general and
jurisdiction in particular, see Burbank, supra note 1.
158 See Treaty Draft supra note 32, art. 1 (delineating the treaty's substantive scope).
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result through an interstate compact, 59 so that even interstate cases
would come within the, sweep of the uniform jurisdictional law.
Perhaps such an inspirational role for the treaty is all one reason-
ably can expect. But inspirations for jurisdictional reform have come
and gone over the years. Unfortunately, the states' records of reform
in restraining and clarifying their jurisdiction demonstrate that state
reform remains a utopian pipe dream. 160 If the states fail to act, Con-
gress could legislate that federal and state courts have jurisdiction ac-
cording to the treaty's criteria, regardless of whether the defendant is
domiciled here or abroad. Of course, this congressional intervention,
highly desirable as it may be, is even less likely as a political matter
than state reform. 161 But international agreement on the Hague
treaty would make dreaming such dreams possible.
What a shame, then, if the treaty negotiations were to fail or re-
treat to a much reduced scope!162 The sunk efforts, however, need
not go for naught. Reformers, such as the American Law Institute,
could use the best U.S. proposal at the Hague to create a model stat-
ute that fully formulates the law of territorial jurisdiction. This model
could salvage and perfect the attempt to codify specific jurisdiction
into restrained and clear mandatory rules and to pare general jurisdic-
tion down to its proper scope, while pushing constitutional limits into
the background where they belong. This model statute then could
inspire both the states and Congress.
Envisaging these reforms naturally raises a number of concerns,
especially with regard to the most extreme recommendation that Con-
gress enact some version of the treaty's provisions for all international
and interstate cases in both federal and state courts. Three concerns
are obvious enough to warrant discussion.
First, do we want to tie domestic law to the terms of a treaty? This
linkage may raise a concern, but it is not really a problem. Blindly
carrying the treaty's terms over into domestic law is neither mandatory
nor even appropriate. Italy, for example, added residence as a basis
forjurisdiction to the Brussels Convention's basis of domicile.' 63 Con-
159 Cf LeonardJ. Feldman, The Interstate Compact: A Cooperative Solution to Complex Liti-
gation in State Courts, 12 RExV. LrrG. 137, 138-41 (1992) (explaining the states' power to
enter into interstate compacts and the utility of their doing so in order to resolve difficult
issues like complex multiforum litigation).
160 See Martin B. Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A
Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C. L.
REv. 407, 431-32 (1980) (noting pressures on states to expand their reach). Judges tend to
compound the problem, as suggested by the spirit of their old maxim, bonijudicis est am-
pliarejurisdictionem, or it is the duty of a good judge to enlarge the jurisdiction.
161 See Clermont, supra note 1, at 442 n.139.
162 For a suggestion of the odds, see supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
163 See Law No. 218 of May 31, 1995, art. 3(1), Gazz. Uff., Supp. Ord. No. 128,June 3,
1995 (authorizingjurisdiction based on reidenza or domicilio), translated in 35 I.L.M. at 765.
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gress should legislate with attention to domestic needs, and it should
take the opportunity in its extensions of the treaty to rewrite any dis-
tasteful compromises made to secure international agreement. Never-
theless, drafters of a statute should treat the treaty as a presumptively
appropriate first draft. After all, internationally agreed norms deserve
some respect. Moreover, practical benefits of simplicity and consis-
tency would result from the statute's avoiding unnecessary discrepan-
cies with the treaty.
Second, do we want to federalize jurisdictional law? The recom-
mendation of congressional intervention, on first impression, seems
to be such a big step. But the actual change from current practice
would be both slight and wholly appropriate. The Supreme Court in
large part has already federalized the law of state-court territorial juris-
diction by deriving the operative law from the Due Process Clause.
Moreover, the law of interstate and international jurisdiction is inher-
ently a federal interest and within federal powers to regulate. Finally,
the states thus far have made poor use of their current powers to re-
strain their reach and to clarify their jurisdictional law.
Third, do we want to force courts to accept jurisdiction? This
concern expresses specifically a general fear of trying to do too much
in the way of transporting international reform to the domestic scene.
Even if the revolution of a jurisdictional statute came to pass, why
make its rules mandatory so that a court with jurisdiction must exer-
cise it? The reason is that the existence of a statute, prohibiting juris-
diction to all but a few courts, naturally would suggest that the proper
courts must exercise their jurisdiction. Because the statute would
eliminate exorbitant jurisdiction, forum non conveniens no longer
would be justified.1 64 For another example, the need for fraud-and-
force and immunity doctrines would disappear with the end of tran-
sient jurisdiction. In general, procedural laws that permit courts to
decline territorial jurisdiction should suffer repeal. 165
164 The new statute probably should contain a transfer mechanism. See supra note 88.
The statute probably should have a lis pendens provision analogous to the treaty. See supra
note 146.
165 Presumably, however, a state could apply a more substantive door-dosing statute.
For example, a statute might close the courthouse doors to any action brought by a foreign
corporation that had failed to comply with a requirement to register before transacting
business in the state. This restriction on the plaintiffs qualifications is sufficiently remote
from traditional notions of territorial jurisdiction to avoid violating the treaty or federal
statute. Moreover, the policy here is more substantive than the desirable distribution
among courts of judicial business. Accordingly, a state door-closing statute of this type
would apply in federal court under the Erie doctrine. See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,
337 U.S. 535, 538-39 (1949).
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III
CONSTITrTiONALITY OF REFORM
A. Can a Treaty or Federal Statute Provide for Jurisdiction That
Exceeds Due Process Standards?
The simple answer to this question is no. Not even a treaty can
trump the Constitution.166 Accordingly, good faith requires the U.S.
negotiators to insist on a treaty that stays within due process's outer
limits. Moreover, the practical demands of public relations during the
U.S. ratification process require a treaty that conforms to due process
standards. 167
The treaty, however, could ensure constitutionality by including a
provision that allows a court to refuse jurisdiction, or recognition and
enforcement, when forbidden by its constitution. 68 Alternatively, if
an extraordinary and unexpected case were to arise where treaty juris-
diction proved unconstitutional in application, then the U.S. court
could breach the treaty, probably without serious international conse-
quence.1 69 Despite these qualifications, the negotiators still should
aim for a treaty that stays within the limits of due process.
One could rephrase the titular question into one that is harder:
Can a treaty or federal statute provide for jurisdiction that stretches,
without exceeding, the limits of due process? Indeed, this question is
hard enough to require illustration by specific example. One treaty
proposal would create a basis ofjurisdiction favoring consumer plain-
tiffs by allowing suit where the plaintiff is habitually resident at the
time of contracting, despite the weakness of the defendant's contacts
with that forum. More precisely, jurisdiction might extend to an out-
of-state contract claim that does not arise from the plaintiff's business
or profession, but relates to the defendant's commercial activities
"conducted within or related to the sale, purchase or use of goods or
services in" the forum state.' 70
166 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1957); Maier, supra note 48, at 1209-16 (dis-
cussing constitutional limitations on a court applying an international treaty governing
jurisdiction); Weintraub, supra note 107, at 1274-77.
167 See Maier, supra note 48, at 1215-16.
168 See supra text accompanying note 155. A more complicated drafting solution would
be the so-called mixed convention. See supra text accompanying note 142.
169 Cf. Strauss, supra note 42, at 1238 (describing consequences of a conflict between a
treaty and the Constitution).
170 Treaty Outline, supra note 32, art. 7, var. 3; cf. Brussels Convention, supra note 3, art.
13, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. at 1421 (covering a person's contract, outside the
person's trade or profession but not for transport, that is (i) for the sale of goods on credit
or (ii) for the supply of goods or services if advertised at the person's home or if concluded
by the person's steps there). The Brussels Convention is now undergoing revision, and the
current draft would cover a contract that (i) is for the sale of goods on credit or (ii) falls
within the scope of the other party's commercial or professional activities pursued in or
directed to the consumer's country. See Working Party on Revision of the Brussels and
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Could a treaty or federal statute constitutionally provide for such
consumer-contractjurisdiction? When the claim arises out of or suffi-
ciently relates to the defendant's state-directed activity, much of this
consumer-contract jurisdiction falls within the Due Process Clause.
However, one could hypothesize that a consumer might sue at home
on an out-of-state contract, when the defendant's in-state activities are
relatively slight and minimally linked to the out-of-state activity from
which the claim actually arose. Thus, some of the new consumer-con-
tract jurisdiction, if adopted, would appear to be unconstitutional
under current doctrine. 17 1
Ever narrowing the question, one could ask: Would the
treatymakers' or lawmakers' affirmative adoption of a consumer-con-
tract provision affect the constitutionality of this jurisdiction? Presum-
ably, the negotiated, agreed, and accepted treaty's terms or the
enacted statute's terms for protecting consumers would pass the un-
reasonableness test.172 The United States Supreme Court would find
it difficult to hold this consumer-contract jurisdiction unreasonable
when the international community and Congress have settled on this
kind of jurisdiction. 7 3 Indeed, the Supreme Court traditionally has
taken into account legislative views on jurisdictional
reasonableness. 174
The high hurdle, then, is the power test. One could certainly
argue that the time has come for the Court to jettison the power test
as an unsound scheme for the allocation of territorial jurisdiction. 175
However, the negotiators cannot responsibly proceed on the assump-
tion that the Court would do so.176 Instead, they must face this diffi-
cult question: Would consumer-contract jurisdiction, if adopted, run
aground on the power test? It is necessary to address this question in
the context of both international and domestic litigation.
Lugano Conventions, Revised Meeting Document No. 18, Doc. SN 2581/1/99 REV 1, at 9
(Apr. 26, 1999). Similarly, the Hague treaty is moving toward a "purposefully directed"
requirement minimizing the constitutional problem. The most recent draft extends juris-
diction to an out-of-state consumer contract only if it relates to the defendant's trade or
professional activities engaged in or directed to the forum state and if the plaintiff has
taken the steps necessary for the conclusion of the contract in the forum state. See Treaty
Draft, supra note 32, art. 7(1).
171 See, e.g., Ratliff v. Cooper Lab., 444 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971) (holding occa-
sional in-state sales of the same drug to be insufficiently related to the out-of-state sale to
support jurisdiction).
172 See Borchers, supra note 97, at 1173-75.
173 SeeJuenger, supra note 17, at 122-23.
174 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 214-15 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 252-53 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221, 224
(1957); see also Borchers, supra note 89, at 154.
175 See supra text accompanying note 83.
176 See Weintraub, supra note 107, at 1273-74.
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1. International Litigation
The context of international litigation is a peculiar one for ad-
dressing this hard question. The only cases in U.S. courts that would
raise this question directly would be suits against foreigners. Courts
have never definitively held that foreigners have a constitutional right
to contest territorial jurisdiction by invoking any or all of substantive
due process. 17 7 Hence, the more troubling constitutional question
might arise when a U.S. court enforces a foreign judgment based on
the treaty's consumer-contract jurisdiction against a U.S. defendant.
Here too, however, the case would not immediately involve due pro-
cess because the courts have never firmly established that a litigant
can raise the substantive due process power test to defeat a foreign
judgment.178 Nevertheless, if a U.S. court would allow a defendant to
raise the power test against such a present or prior exercise of con-
sumer-contractjurisdiction, the court would face the difficult question
of whether the treaty could supplant the power test in international
litigation. At present, the answer to this novel question must remain
in terms of likelihood.
Such a "stretching" of due process by the treaty likely would fall
within the U.S. treatymakers' constitutional mandate. The task of al-
locating jurisdiction is nonjudicial in nature, although the Supreme
Court has performed this function by default in the past. The
treatymakers have extensive powers under the foreign relations and
commerce headings.179 As long as they responsibly perform the legis-
lative function of allocating jurisdiction, the Court likely will step aside
and accept their articulation of the power test. Therefore, the treaty
ought to be able to supplant the moribund power test for the alloca-
tion of territorial authority on the international level.
2. Domestic Litigation
If Congress were to extend the treaty's provisions fully into do-
mestic law, the resulting statute then would raise the due process issue
in pure form. A U.S. defendant could claim a violation of due pro-
cess, if a plaintiff tried to use consumer-contract jurisdiction against
the defendant in state court.
177 See BoRN, supra note 50, at 92; Strauss, supra note 42, at 1256 n.93.
178 See Willis L.M. Reese, The Status in This Count7y of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50
COLUM. L. REV. 783, 786-87 (1950) (explaining that U.S. courts at times apply only the
reasonableness test); Hans Smit, International ResJudicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United
States, 9 UCLA L. REv. 44, 47 (1962) (explaining that the issue in determining the validity
of foreign judgments is "whether it would be unfair or arbitrary to hold binding on the
parties involved ajudgment obtained in the foreign proceedings under inspection").
179 See Borchers, supra note 97, at 1164-73.
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Yet the same argument still should prevail, so that the statute
would supplant the moribund power test in the allocation of territo-
rial authority on the interstate level. Here, Congress's powers are just
as extensive as the treatymakers'. On the interstate front, Congress
could rest its action on either the Commerce Clause or the provision
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause that empowers it to prescribe the
effect of sister-state judgments.18 0
B. Can a Treaty or Federal Statute Force the States to Accept
Jurisdiction?
The answer to this question is a complicated yes. The question is
so difficult as to lead some to suggest that Congress might want to
duck it by expanding federal subject-matterjurisdiction to open the fed-
eral courts whenever the treaty or federal statute authorizes territorial
jurisdiction that the state refuses to exercise. The states have little
interest in declining their maximum jurisdiction, so in practice, few
cases would follow this route into federal court. Arguably, then, open-
ing the federal-court route might be preferable to forcing a test of
congressional powers.
However, a new head of subject-matter jurisdiction would cause
many problems and spawn wasteful litigation. Therefore, it is ulti-
mately worth considering the actual limit on congressional powers.
The question is again hard enough to necessitate an example.
Although one could stick with the example of Congress's imposing
new consumer-contract jurisdiction on the states, one instead could
imagine a Bhopal-type case' 8 ' in a state court against a local corporate
defendant. Imagine that the state court formerly would have applied
forum non conveniens, but Congress now has directed the state court
to hear the case. Would Congress's action be consistent with the
Constitution?
1. International Litigation
If the treaty makes exercise of its jurisdiction mandatory in the
international cases, Congress then might pass this obligation on to the
states. If the states balked, however, the hard question of congres-
sional powers would arise.
18o See Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of PersonalJurisdiction, 57 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 849, 852 (1989). But see Stanley E. Cox, Why Properly Construed Due Process
Limits on Personal Jurisdiction Must Always Trump Contrary Treaty Provisions, 61 ALB. L. REv.
1177, 1195-97 (1998).
181 See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
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Congress arguably has the substantive power to instruct the states
to exercise full territorial jurisdiction for, say, admiralty cases. 182 In-
deed, it remains an open question whether the federal common law
of forum non conveniens, even without a statutory directive, displaces
state law when state courts entertain international admiralty cases.' 8 3
But in implementing the treaty, Congress might broadly command
the states to exercise territorialjurisdiction in all sorts of cases, such as
run-of-the-mill tort cases. It would be difficult to argue that federal
substance-specific constitutional authority reaches far enough for
Congress to impose a general obligation on the states to hear all cases
covered by the treaty. However, as already explained, Congress has
extensive general powers under the foreign relations and commerce
headings. 184  Thus, Congress presumptively has authority wide
enough to encompass the jurisdictional command to the states.
Yet, could Congress force the states to exercise territorial jurisdic-
tion as provided by the treaty without violating the Tenth Amend-
ment? The Tenth Amendment argument in this situation is often a
paper tiger.'8 5 Nevertheless, at its affirmative core, the Tenth Amend-
ment prevents Congress from directly ordering the states to take gov-
ernmental action.'8 6 According to the Supreme Court's recent
pronouncements, however, this prohibition extends only to the state
executive and legislature.' 8 7 Congress therefore can tell the state
courts to hear cases of federal concern.188
2. Domestic Litigation
If Congress were to extend the treaty's provisions into domestic
cases, the legislators would find it desirable, although not necessary,
182 See David S. Welkowitz, Beyond Burger King: The Federal Interest in Personal Jurisdic-
tion, 56 FoRDHAuv L. REv. 1, 49-51 (1987).
183 See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 457 (1994).
184 See supra text accompanying notes 96-97, 180.
185 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) ("To answer this question it is not
enough to refer to the Tenth Amendment .... .");JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTrrunONAL LAw 188-94, 217-19 (5th ed. 1995).
186 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992); RicHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHsLER's THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND T=E FEDERAL SYSTEM 476-78 (4th ed. 1996).
187 See Print, 521 U.S. at 907-12 (dictum); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759-70
(1982). But cf. Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997
Sup. CT. Rxv. 199, 212-17 (criticizing the judicial exemption in Printz).
188 See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (holding that a state court cannot refuse
to hear a claim based on the Emergency Price Control Act when the court hears the same
type of claim arising under state law); cf Douglas v. NewYork, New Haven & Hartford R.R,
279 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1929) (holding that the duty of state courts to hear FELA claims is
excused when the claim is blocked by a nondiscriminatory state door-closing statute similar
to forum non conveniens).
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to make the jurisdiction mandatory for interstate cases. Thus, the
same question of congressional powers would arise.
Although its foreign relations power drops out of the picture,
Congress still has extensive domestic authority to command the states
to exercise territorial jurisdiction. 189  The Tenth Amendment
counterargument remains unavailing for the reasons already given.
In fact, one could argue that even in the absence of an explicit
congressional command, the states would have to exercise full juris-
diction under the treaty and statute. If the states were to refuse to
hear international and interstate cases in specified categories or
through case-by-case balancing, the states' discrimination against fed-
eral concerns would violate the Testa doctrine. 190 The state-law doc-
trines of concern here would be coterminous with the groups of cases
that Congress had specified through the treaty and statute as holding
a special federal interest. After all, the states entertain similar claims
that are local in nature, and the Supreme Court currently draws anal-
ogies between federal and state claims at a high level of generic ab-
straction.191 The states therefore could not single out for
discriminatory treatment the international and interstate cases the
federal government had agreed and decreed that U.S. courts could
entertain.
A broader and less awkward way to view the problem is through
the lens of a reverse-Erie displacement of state procedure, 192 rather
than a Testajurisdictional analysis. On the issue of territorial jurisdic-
tion, the special federal interests that the treaty and statute would ex-
press, and the federal interests in avoiding forum-shopping and
inequitable administration of the laws, overcome a state's interests in
having its law limit international and interstate reach.' 93 The federal
law extending reach beyond state law therefore would apply in state
court with binding force under the Supremacy Clause.
CONCLUSION
The United States should vigorously pursue its interests while ne-
gotiating the Hague multilateral convention on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters. It then should sign and ratify the expected agreement, even
189 See supra text accompanying notes 96 & 180.
190 See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 369-70 (1990); Testa, 330 U.S. at 394; McKnett v.
St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 233-34 (1934); Mondou v. New York, New Haven &
Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 55-58 (1912); FALLON ET AL., supra note 186, at 472-76.
191 See Michael G. Collins, Article L7 Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compro-
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if that means abandoning transient jurisdiction, attachment jurisdic-
tion, doing business as a basis for general jurisdiction, and forum non
conveniens.
Indeed, Congress then should consider following the Italian
model of enacting the jurisdictional part of the treaty as domestic law.
Even if treaty negotiations fail, Congress should consider enacting the
best U.S. proposal made at the Hague. It should legislate that federal
and state courts, not only in all international cases but even in inter-
state cases, possess jurisdiction if and only if the case's circumstances
satisfy the treaty's or the proposal's analogous jurisdictional provision.
These reforms are within the treatymakers' and Congress's pow-
ers. The reforms would work wonders in untangling the mess that is
the U.S. law of territorial jurisdiction in civil cases.
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APPENDIX
REFORM OF THE ITALIAN SYSTEM OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Law No. 218 of May 31, 1995, Gazz. Uff., Supp. Ord. No. 128, June
3, 1995, translated in 35 I.L.M. 765, 1144 (1996).
Article 1 (Scope of application)
1. This law shall determine the Italian jurisdiction, lay down the crite-
ria to identify the applicable law, and govern the effects of foreign
judgments and acts.
Article 2 (International conventions)
1. The provisions of this law shall not affect the application of any
international conventions to which Italy is a party.
2. The interpretation of those conventions shall take account of their
international character as well as of the need for uniform application.
Article 3 (Scope of jurisdiction)
1. Italian courts shall have jurisdiction if the defendant is domiciled or
resides in Italy or has a representative in this country who is enabled
to appear in court pursuant to Article 77 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, as well as in the other cases provided for by law.
2. Italian courts shall further have jurisdiction according to the crite-
ria set out in [the long-arm provisions in Articles 5-15 of the Brussels
Convention], including when the defendant is not domiciled in the
territory of a contracting State, with respect to any of the matters fall-
ing within the scope of application of the Convention. With regard to
other matters, jurisdiction shall be also determined according to the
criteria laid down for territorial jurisdiction.
Article 4 (Acceptance and derogation of jurisdiction)
1. Where jurisdiction cannot be determined pursuant to Article 3, Ital-
ian courts shall nonetheless have jurisdiction if the parties have
agreed to it and such acceptance is evidenced in writing, or if the
defendant enters an appearance without pleading the lack ofjurisdic-
tion in his statement of defense.
2. The jurisdiction of any Italian court may be derogated from by an
agreement in favor of a foreign court or arbitration if such derogation
is evidenced in writing and the action concerns alienable rights.
3. Derogation shall have no effect if the court or the arbitrators de-
cline jurisdiction or cannot hear the action.
Article 5 (Actions concerning rights in rem in immovables situated abroad)
1. Italian courts shall have no jurisdiction over actions concerning
rights in rem in immovables situated abroad.
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Article 6 (Preliminary questions)
1. Italian courts shall have incidental cognizance of questions which
do not fall within the scope of Italian jurisdiction, where their settle-
ment is necessary in order to decide on an action brought to court.
Article 7 (Lis pendens)
1. Where in a proceeding a plea of lis pendens is brought concerning
an action between the same parties having the same object and the
same title, the Italian court may stay the proceeding if it deems that
the decision of the foreign court may produce an effect in the Italian
legal system. If the foreign court declines its jurisdiction or the for-
eign decision is not recognized under Italian law, the Italian court
shall continue the proceeding upon the application of the party
concerned.
2. The condition of lis pendens shall be established pursuant to the
law of the State where the action is brought.
3. If the outcome of a proceeding in an Italian court depends upon
the outcome of a proceeding pending before a foreign court, the Ital-
ian court may stay its proceeding where it deems that the foreign judg-
ment may produce an effect in the Italian legal system.
Article 8 (Time element for determining jurisdiction)
1. Article 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply when determin-
ing the jurisdiction of Italian courts. However, an Italian court shall
have jurisdiction if the facts and rules determining jurisdiction super-
vene in the course of the proceeding.
Article 9 (Voluntary jurisdiction)
1. In matters of voluntary jurisdiction, Italian courts shall have juris-
diction, in addition to the cases specifically referred to in this law as
well as whenever the territorial jurisdiction of an Italian court is pro-
vided for, if the decision which is sought concerns either an Italian
national or a person who is resident in Italy, or where the decision
concerns situations or relationships to which Italian law applies.
Article 10 (Provisional measures)
1. With respect to provisional measures, Italian courts shall have juris-
diction if such measures are to be enforced in Italy or an Italian court
has jurisdiction over the merits.
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Article 11 (Pleading lack of jurisdiction)
1. Only the defendant who entered an appearance and did not accept
the jurisdiction of an Italian court, either expressly or tacitly, may
plead lack of jurisdiction at any stage and in any instance of a pro-
ceeding. The court shall plead lack of jurisdiction ex officio, at any
stage and degree of a proceeding, if the defendant is in default, if the
circumstances referred to under Article 5 apply, or if the jurisdiction
of Italian courts is ruled out under an international agreement.
Articles 12-74
[omitted]
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